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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
TONY R. MAESTAS,

Case No. 960831-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether trial counsel for Appellant Tony Maestas

("Maestas") was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present evidence at trial that would impeach the credibility of
the state's key witness, Tony Waldron, including evidence of his
criminal history and evidence of the favorable treatment he
received shortly after Maestas1 arrest.
Standard of Review: "When, as in this case, the claim of
ineffective assistance is raised for the first time on appeal, we
resolve the issue as a matter of law."

State v. Gallegos. 355

Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Strain,
885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994)).

Also, "where the trial

court has held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings
relevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim," this
Court will "defer to the trial court's findings of fact," and
then "apply the appropriate legal principles to the facts and

decide, for the first time on appeal, whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment.11 State v. Hucrcrins, 920 P. 2d 1195, 1198 (Utah
App. 1996) (cites omitted).
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

revoking Maestas' probation, where the state failed to present
evidence that the alleged probation violation was willful.
Standard of Review:
"The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in
the discretion of the trial court." State v. Jameson, 800
P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Archuleta, 812
P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, in order to prevail in
this case, defendant "must show that the evidence of a
probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court
abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation."
Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804 (footnote omitted); Archuleta, 812
P.2d at 82. Moreover, a trial court's finding of a probation violation is a factual one and therefore must be given
deference on appeal unless the finding is clearly erroneous.
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09 (Utah App. 1991).
State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994).
3.

Whether the arrest, which did not comply with Utah law,

was illegal, thereby invalidating the search incident to arrest.
Standard of Review:

A trial court's decision to admit

evidence seized as a result of a search implicating a defendant's
Fourth Amendment right is a "mixed question of law and fact []
appropriately resolved under a bifurcated examination of, first,
the predicate historical facts found by the trial court, weighed
against a clearly erroneous standard, and, second, of the
emerging legal conclusion, evaluated for correctness."

State v.

Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991) (cites omitted).
2

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Maestas has raised the first issue in the context of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Ineffective assistance
of counsel may be reviewed for the first time on direct appeal by
this Court where defendant is "represented by new counsel on
appeal," and the record is adequate to review the claim. State v.
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). Maestas has met those
requirements in this matter.
The second issue, the probation-revocation matter, was
preserved in the record on appeal in District Court Case No.
921901600 (hereinafter "R.") at 601-655; 740-41.
The third issue concerning the legality of the arrest was
preserved in the record on appeal in District Court Case No.
950902479 (hereinafter "Case No. 950902479") at 160-162.

The

trial court agreed to allow Maestas to file papers concerning the
matter in order to properly preserve the issue for purposes of
appeal.

(R. 686-88; 690; 718; 730.)

However, notwithstanding

requests by the defense to rule on the merits of the matter, the
trial judge declined to do so and ruled that Maestas would not be
allowed to have the issue resolved before sentencing; according
to the re-sentencing judge, the issue would have to go to the
Court of Appeals for resolution. (R. 734-35.)

Thus, in the

alternative, Maestas has raised the third issue on appeal in the
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (this Court may review matter for the
first time on direct appeal), and under the plain error doctrine.
3

See State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (UtahApp.), cert, denied,
868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993); State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah
1996) (appellate court will address issue raised for the first
time on appeal under the plain error doctrine).
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-13-1 et. seq. (1986 & Supp. 1992)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1994)
Utah Const, art. I, § 12
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
U.S. Const, amend. IV
U.S. Const, amend. VI
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
A. Maestas Was Charged with and Convicted of Drug-Related
Offenses.
In March 1992, Maestas was charged with unlawful
distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a
public school, a First Degree Felony offense in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953 as amended), and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony
offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953
as amended).

(R. 6-7.)

Maestas was represented by private

counsel during the proceedings.

(R. 25.) The case went to trial
4

in April 1993 (R. 42, 73), and the jury found Maestas guilty on
both charges.

(R. 69-72.)

Judgment was entered against Maestas

(R. 104-06), and the judge stayed the prison sentence and ordered
Maestas to serve probation.
B.

(R. 138-39.)

Private Counsel Failed to Perfect the Appeal.

In June 1993, private counsel filed a notice of appeal in
this case (R. 76-77), but failed to take any further action in
connection with the appeal.

In June 1994, this Court dismissed

the appeal. (R. 109; 123-24.)
C.

The Trial Court Revoked Probation.

Thereafter, the state filed an order to show cause why
probation should not be revoked. In September 1994 the trial
court revoked probation and Maestas was sent to prison to serve
his sentence.

(R. 146-48; 152-53.)

D. Maestas Initiated a Rule 65B Petition for Relief from
Conviction and Extraordinary Writ Claiming Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and that His Right to Appeal Had Been
Violated.
In October 1994, Maestas filed a second notice of appeal (R.
150), which apparently was dismissed on Maestas1 own motion (see
R. documents unnumbered in pleadings file between 155 and 157).
In addition, in April 1995, Maestas commenced an action by filing
a Verified Rule 65B Petition for Relief from Conviction and Extraordinary Writ, wherein he asserted, among other things, that
his right to appeal had been violated by counsel's failure to
perfect and pursue the appeal. (See Case No. 950902479.)
E. As a Result of the Postconviction Filings, Maestas Was
Re-sentenced in Order that He Could Pursue His Original
Appeal.
5

In 1996, the trial court consolidated matters relevant to
the trial and raised in the Rule 65B proceedings with the
original criminal action.
(Case No. 950902479

Thereafter, Maestas was re-sentenced.

at 146, 154, 156-64; also R. 174-77.) In

accordance with Utah law, Maestas is appealing from the judgments
of conviction dated June 17, 1996 (R. 175-78), and attached as
Addendum B.

See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37-38 (Utah 1981)

(if defendant was misled in believing that appeal was being taken
and such time lapsed to prevent defendant from pursuing appeal,
he should be re-sentenced in the matter nunc pro tunc so as to
afford him an opportunity to timely perfect an appeal).
F. This Court Remanded the Matter to the Trial Court for
Findings Pursuant to Rule 23B Regarding Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel.
In June 1997, this Court granted Maestas' Motion for Remand
for Supplementation of the Record and for Determination of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and ordered that the case be
t

remanded to the trial court for findings regarding the claim of
ineffective eissistance of counsel.
attached her€*to as Addendum C.

A copy of that order is

Consistent with the Rule 23B

remand, Findings were entered in the trial court, and are
attached hereto as Addendum D.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1
A. The Department of Corrections Initiated an Undercover
Operation Targeting Dealers, Who Were Supplying Drugs to
Inmates in the Prison; Maestas Was Not a Target of the
Operation.
i
6

Officials from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") engaged
in a clandestine operation to determine the source of unlawful
drugs going into the Utah State Prison. (R. 368; 384.) The
officers arranged for an inmate, Tony Waldron, to make contact
with specific persons outside the facility, who officers believed
had been supplying drugs to individuals in the prison.(See R.
255; 358-59; 374.)

DOC officials had a list of four or five

suppliers who Waldron would contact. (R. 385.) Nothing in the
record supports that Maestas was on that list.
Indeed, the record supports that officials and Waldron did
not consider Maestas to be a target of the operation.
Correctional officers admitted that the operation "had nothing to
do with Maestas." (R. 239; see also 266-68; 362-63; 385.) Likewise, the trial judge in this case found that Maestas' involvement in the matter was "an accidental happening." (R. 284.)
On the day of the transaction, Waldron made contact with two
women who were to line him up with a targeted supplier.

(R.

233.) The women attempted to make contact with the supplier by
telephone and pager, but were unsuccessful. (R. 234; 239; 36162.) Thereafter, the women indicated they may be able to buy
drugs from Maestas.(R. 234; 362-63.) Although the DOC had no
reason to involve Maestas in the matter, there was no effort to
refocus the operation to its intended purpose, and no effort to
involve local law enforcement. Rather, Waldron and the women
found Maestas, and according to evidence presented at trial,
purchased drugs. (R. 234-35; 363; 376-77.)
7

Thereafter, as Maestas and a second person left in Maestas !
car from the apartment where the transaction allegedly occurred,
correctional officials followed and engaged overhead lights to
pull Maestas over to the side of the road. (R. 270.)
Investigator Sundguist arrested Maestas and searched Maestas and
the car. (R. 271/ 273.)

According to Sundquist, in connection

with the search, he confiscated approximately $385 in cash, a
white powdery substance, and an additional substance that
Sundquist found in Maestas1 pockets. (R. 271.)

Maestas was

charged with one count each of unlawful distribution and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance.

(R. 006-007.)
i

B. During the Trial, Defense Counsel Failed to Impeach the
State's Key Witness with Evidence that Had a Direct Impact
on his Credibility.
The case went to trial. (See R. 295-503.)

During cross-

examination of Waldron, defense counsel failed to inquire into
matters impugning Waldron's character. (R. 374-83.) Specifically,
Waldron had been convicted of several counts of forgery,
aggravated assault by a prison inmate and felony fleeing; his
history included additional forgery-related convictions; he was
suspected of smuggling drugs into the prison and had a history of
hiding drugs on his person and otherwise possessing drugs while
in the prison; he was found to have injection sites on his arm;
and Waldron was never charged or disciplined in connection with a
i

drug smuggling investigation that began in the prison in November
1991. (R. 784-89.)

Waldron was given a parole date of January

1993. (R. 785.) Yet, approximately two weeks after Waldron's
i

8

involvement in the alleged transaction with Maestas, Waldron was
paroled from prison.

Waldron was paroled 9 months earlier than

scheduled, on April 2, 1992. (R. 786.)
C. Maestas1 Probation Was Revoked.
In April 1993, the jury found Maestas guilty of the offenses
as charged (R. 69, 70), and the judge stayed the prison sentence
for 3 6 months while Maestas served probation in the Odyssey House
program.

(R. 104-06.)

Thereafter, on June 23, 1994, Adult Probation and Parole
filed a Progress/Violation Report with the court alleging that
Maestas had "become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking
staff and personnel at Odyssey House."

(R. 110.) In response,

the court issued a warrant for Maestas' arrest and ordered him to
show cause why probation should not be revoked.

(R. 112-18.)

The order to show cause alleged the following:
[D]efendant has failed to participate and comply to the
conditions set forth by the Odyssey House program, which
resulted in his removal from said program on June 23, 1994,
in violation of condition number 11.5 of the defendant's
Probation Agreement and the Court's order.
(R. 118.) At the order to show cause hearing the evidence
reflected that on "a couple of different occasions," Maestas
indicated that he wanted to kill himself.

(R. 615.) He was

placed on a suicide watch and eventually taken to the University
of Utah Hospital emergency room because of the "ideation" he had
"about hurting himself, running in the street, letting someone
run over him." (R. 616.)
The clinical director of the Odyssey House program, Tracy
9

Anderson, told Maestas to let him know if Maestas continued
having suicidal thoughts; if Maestas continued, he would not be
allowed to stay in the program "because [Odyssey House was] not a
psychiatric setting" and was not equipped to handle the matter.
(R. 616-19.)
Anderson acknowledged that Maestas did not violate a "hard"
rule at Odyssey House; rather, Maestas was notified that he could
not engage in "suicide gesturing" since the program was not set
up to deal with that.

(R. 624-25.)

During the hearing, the

court asked the Odyssey House counselor, Albert Nieto, if he
perceived Maestas' conduct as manipulation. The counselor
believed that initially it was, but as it continued, he did not
believe Maestas was manipulative.

(R. 632-33.)

Also, Nieto

acknowledged that Odyssey House failed to substantiate certain
medical problems suffered by Maestas until after Maestas
complained about them, and that the problems were not being
attended to. (R 633-34.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that
"there has been a violation of the terms of the conditions of
probation.

That violation was knowing and intentional under
i

circumstances where the defendant had the ability to comply with
the Court's order on the conditions of probation.
probation will be revoked."

Therefore

(R. 653.) A copy of the trial
1

court's order is attached hereto as Addendum E.

This appeal and

a 23B remand proceeding followed as set forth in the Statement of
the Case, supra.
(
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Maestas' trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to present evidence at trial directly
impacting on the credibility of the state's key witness, Tony
Waldron.

The evidence concerned Waldron's crimes of dishonesty

and the favorable treatment he received shortly after his
involvement in securing Maestas' arrest in this matter.

Defense

counsel likely failed to present the evidence because he was
unaware of it, thereby supporting the determination that he was
also ineffective for failing to conduct an investigation in this
case.

Waldron was the only witness to provide direct evidence

against Maestas of criminal conduct. Defense counsel's failure to
present the credibility evidence prejudiced Maestas.
The state presented insufficient evidence in this case to
support the determination that Maestas willfully violated his
probation. Rather, the evidence supported that Maestas suffered
mental health issues that were beyond his control and not
treatable in the Odyssey House program. The trial court abused
its discretion in revoking Maestas' probation.
Finally, the DOC exceeded the scope of its statutory
authority when it engaged in the undercover operation and arrest
in this case involving Maestas. As a result of exceeding the
statutory authority, the officers' arrest of Maestas was illegal.
The illegal arrest cannot serve to justify the warrantless search
under the incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment.
This case should be reversed and remanded on that basis.
11

ARGUMENT
POINT I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT HAD A DIRECT IMPACT ON WALDRON'S
CREDIBILITY AS A WITNESS FOR THE STATE,
The Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to
assistance of counsel.

The right to counsel has been construed

to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel."

McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); accord State v.
McNicol. 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).

The Court in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth the proper test for
determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable.
Id. at 687; accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah

'

{

(

1990). In this case, defense counsel's performance was deficient
i

in that he faiiled to cross-examine the state's key witness with
evidence that had a direct impact on the witness' credibility.
A. INFORMATION CONCERNING WALDRON'S BACKGROUND WAS
ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH HIS CREDIBILITY; HOWEVER, THE
INFORMATION WAS NEVER PRESENTED TO THE JURY.

<

The state's key witness, Tony Waldron, testified that
Maestas sold cocaine to him for $100. (R. 376-77.)

Waldron
(
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described the transaction to correctional officers through a wire
that he was wearing, and he identified Maestas to officers as the
supplier for purposes of the arrest. (R. 377.)

During cross-

examination, counsel for the defense, Victor Gordon, failed to
introduce evidence of Waldron's criminal background, which
included convictions for crimes of dishonesty, and motive for
Waldron's involvement in ensuring Maestas' arrest and conviction.
Gordon likely failed to introduce the evidence because he was
unaware of it, supporting the determination that Gordon failed to
investigate the matter. Gordon's failures constitute ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, as set forth below.
Specifically, with respect to Waldron's criminal background,
Gordon failed to introduce into evidence information concerning
Waldron's crimes of dishonesty and other matters that would impeach his credibility. A copy of that portion of the trial
transcript containing Waldron's testimony is attached hereto as
Addendum F. As a result of those failures, Maestas requested
remand of this matter in order to supplement the record with
findings of fact regarding Waldron's criminal history.

(See

Addendum C hereto.) "In a situation where the trial court has
held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings relevant to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we defer to the trial
court's findings of fact." State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195, 1198
(Utah App. 1996) (cites omitted).
On remand, the trial court found that Waldron's prison file
reflected the following: Waldron was committed to the prison in
13

1990 in connection with convictions for two counts of forgery,
second degree felony offenses (R. 792). Waldron's record
consisted of 9 additional felony convictions for forgery and one
felony conviction for fraud. An assessment in Waldron's prison
file dated 1987 reflected that Waldron "cannot be trusted at all"
and the file showed that in 1987, 1988 and 1989, Waldron was
involved in smuggling drugs into the prison and disciplined for
possession and use of controlled substances. (R. 793; 794.) In
October 1990, Waldron asked to participate in narcotics
operations and was rejected on the basis that ""it would not be
wise to allow him to participate' because of his history of drug
dependency and attempted escape." (Id.)
As of November 26, 1991, Waldron was under investigation for
suspicion of smuggling drugs from the prison dairy into the D
i

block. On February 21, 1992, Waldron was discovered to have
injection sites on his arm. (R. 792.) Waldron's history presented
credibility issues that should have been brought to the jury's
attention during the trial of this matter.
With respect to evidence of motive, during the 23B remand in
this case, the trial judge found that prior to March 14, 1992,
(

Waldron was scheduled to be released from prison on January 14,
1993.

(R. 792.) On March 14, 1992, Waldron was recruited to

participate in the undercover operation, which resulted in
i

Maestas' arrest. (R. 793.) On April 2, 1992, "a Special Attention
Hearing was held by the Board of Pardons.

A Special Attention

Hearing is a review to grant relief to inmates under special
I
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circumstances where a change of status may be warranted."
793.)

(R.

Such a hearing may be initiated by the receipt of a writ-

ten request indicating that special circumstances exist for which
a change in status may be warranted. Waldron was paroled on that
day. Waldron's parole occurred nine months earlier than scheduled. At the time of his parole, Waldron was serving sentences
for felony offenses consisting of forgery and fraud. (R. 793.)
In July 1992, Waldron was back in custody. (R. 794.) In the
fall of 1992, Waldron was convicted of forgery, aggravated
assault by a prisoner and felony fleeing.

(R. 794.)

During the trial of this matter in April 1993, the
prosecutor asked Waldron if he was "presently an inmate at the
Utah State Prison," to which Waldron responded, "Yes, I am."
374.)

(R.

The prosecutor then asked, "Directing your attention to

the 14th of March of 1992, were you an inmate on that date?"
Waldron answered, "Yes, I was."

(R. 374.)

During cross

examination, Waldron indicated that in connection with his
involvement in the undercover operation, correctional officers
promised they would write a letter of "good recommendation to the
board," and "that was it." (R. 379.)

Neither the prosecutor nor

Waldron disclosed that Waldron actually was released on parole
nine months ahead of schedule and within approximately two weeks
of his participation in the undercover operation.

In fact, the

prosecutor's examination improperly suggested that Waldron had
not been released.
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B. GORDON PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
THAT HE FAILED TO CROSS-EXAMINE WALDRON ABOUT HIS CRIMES OF
DISHONESTY AND ABOUT THE FAVORABLE TREATMENT HE RECEIVED
APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE
UNDERCOVER OPERATION.
1. Evidence Concerning Waldron's Crimes of Dishonesty Was
Admissible.
It is fundamental that pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Evidence, "the credibility of a party may be attacked by any
party." Utah R. Evid 607 (1993). Further, for the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness
has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or a false
statement is admissible, and is not subject to the general
balancing considerations of Rule 403.

Utah R. Evid. 609(a) (1)

and (2) (1993); State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 531 (Utah App. 1989).
Evidence of a witness' prior conviction may be presented
through the oral testimony of the witness or by presenting the
court record of such conviction.
1387, 1390 (Utah 1977).

State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d

In this case, evidence of Waldron's

crimes of forgery involved dishonesty and would have been
automatically admissible to impugn Waldron's credibility.
Ross, 782 P.2d at 531.

See

Likewise, evidence concerning Waldron's

fraud conviction was admissible since the crime involved
dishonesty or a false statement.

See State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d

391, 395 (Utah App. 1994).
During the trial in this matter, Gordon failed to impugn
Waldron's character with the important and admissible credibility
evidence.

Since "[c]ross-examination is the principal means by

which the believability of a witness and the truth of his
16

testimony are tested," State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah
1985) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)),
Gordon's deficient performance was "so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Indeed, Waldron

was the state's key witness; he was the only person to provide
evidence directly linking Maestas to the alleged transaction.
Gordon's cross-examination necessarily should have involved
exposing Waldron's crimes of dishonesty.
While the record fails to support a tactical reason for
Gordon's failure to impeach Waldron's credibility, the record
suggests that Gordon failed to introduce the credibility evidence
on cross-examination because he was unaware of Waldron's criminal
history.

That is, Gordon failed to discover the information.

Such a failure constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel. The record supports that even though Gordon would have
known that Waldron was an inmate at the time that Waldron
participated in the undercover operation, Gordon did not
investigate why Waldron was serving time in prison.
investigation should have been obvious to Gordon.
the information was readily available.

Such an
In addition,

For example, Gordon could

have reviewed court records concerning Waldron's convictions or
discovered the information pursuant to the Government Records
Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, et. seq.
(1993).

(See R. 792 (records concerning Waldron's history were
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discoverable through GRAMA).)
As a matter of law, failure to investigate constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.

A trial counsel's decision

not to investigate the underlying facts of a case cannot be
considered a valid tactical decision.

Huggins, 920 P. 2d at

1198; State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) (»"a
decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical
decision1") (quoting Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188).

""[T]he Sixth

Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because
reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional
decisions [,] and informed legal choices can be made only after
investigation of options.f" State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085,
1090 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680).
The lack of important cross-examination in this case
i

supports the determination that Maestas' trial counsel did not
investigate the matter.

,|S

[C]ounsel has a duty to make reason-

able investigations or to make a reasonable
particular

investigations

unnecessary.

decision

that

makes

'" Hugcrins, 920 P.2d at

1199 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91).

In this case, the

failure to investigate lead to the failure to expose Waldron's
history of dishonesty.

<

Gordon's performance was deficient.

2. Evidence Exposing the Favorable Treatment that Waldron
Received in Connection with His Involvement in Ensuring
Maestas' Arrest Was Relevant to Waldron's Motives for
Testifying Against Maestas.

<

Evidence that the witness had a motive for participating in
the matter and testifying against the defendant is relevant to
(
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the cross-examination.

The Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly

recognized the critical effect that a fact finder's perception of
a witness1 bias may have on the outcome of a case."

Leonard, 707

P.2d at 654 (cites omitted). In this case, Gordon elicited
testimony that Waldron had assisted officers in undercover
operations in the past, resulting in no arrests.
claimed that Waldron was "0 for 3."

(R. 398.)

Officers

The evidence

supports that Waldron may have felt pressure to supply
information that would lead to an arrest.

Yet, Waldron stated

during direct examination that the only benefit he received as a
result of his participation in the operation was a
"recommendation" from the Department of Corrections to the Board
of Pardons & Parole. (R. 3 79.)
In fact, Waldron was released from prison approximately two
weeks from the date of his involvement in the undercover
operation. (R. 793.) His release was nine months ahead of
schedule. (R. 792-93.)

Waldron never disclosed that he was

actually paroled early, and the prosecutor allowed the improper
suggestion to go to the jury that Waldron did not receive parole.
The prosecutor specifically did not correct the suggestion left
by his examination that Waldron was in prison from March 1992 to
the date of trial.
"It is

well

settled

that deliberate deception of a court and

jurors by the presentation of known false evidence cannot be
reconciled with the rudimentary demands of justice."

Campbell v.

Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Pvle v. Kansas, 317
19

U.S. 213 (1942)) (emphasis added). "The same result obtains when
the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to
go uncorrected when it appears."
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).

Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois,

Here, "the prosecution allowed a

false impression to be created at trial when the truth would have
directly impugned the veracity of its key witness."

Campbell,

594 F.2d at 8 (citing U.S. v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1243 (4th
Cir. 1976)) .
The false impressions were allowed in this case to go
uncorrected because Gordon failed to raise the matter to the
trial court's attention.

Gordon's failures constitute
i

ineffective assistance of counsel.

In addition, Gordon failed to

present evidence that Waldron was released from prison
approximately two weeks after his direct involvement in the
<

operation resulting in Maestas' arrest and ultimate conviction.
Such evidence would have supported the determination that Waldron
was motivated to implicate Maestas in the transaction in order to
curry favor with the Department of Corrections and the Board of
Pardons and Parole.
Evidence presented in the 23B hearing reflects that officers
promised that a letter of good recommendation would be provided
to the Board of Pardons "in exchange for [Waldron's] cooperation

on an investigation that resulted

in the arrest

and conviction

of
i

Tony Maestas."

(R. 783, Exhibit 6 (emphasis added).) "Mr. Waldron

was told that if the information that he provided was accurate
and led to the

arrest

and conviction
20

of individuals that were

<

trafficking narcotics into the Utah State Prison, a favorable
recommendation would be written on his behalf to the Board of
Pardons & Paroles." (R. 783, Exhibit 6 (emphasis added).)
Since the favorable treatment hinged on Waldron providing
information that was accurate, it was all the more imperative for
Waldron to maintain that Maestas was involved in a drug
transaction at the apartment.

Waldron had a motive to see the

matter through with his testimony that Maestas sold drugs to him.
Waldron was motivated to provide information that would "result"
in an arrest and conviction.

Only in that instance would the

Department of Corrections provide the letter facilitating the
early release. Those facts were important to the defense.
Maestas was entitled to cross-examine Waldron with respect
to his motives and the special treatment Waldron received so soon
after Maestas1 arrest. See State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233
(Utah 1980); see also Leonard, 707 P.2d at 654.

"The exposure of

a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionally protected right of crossexamination. "

Chestnut, 621 P.2d at 1233.

Again, nothing in the record supports that Gordon had a
tactical reason for failing to correct the incorrect impression,
or failing to disclose that Waldron was released from prison so
soon after his involvement in the undercover operation. Rather,
the record supports that Gordon failed to present evidence
regarding the matter because he was unaware of the facts. Gordon
apparently failed to investigate the records reflecting Waldron's
21

incarceration.

A "blatant lack of investigation indicates a

severe deficiency in the performance of trial counsel." Crestani,
771 P.2d at 1090 (quoting Jennings v. Oklahoma, 744 P.2d 212, 214
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987)).

As set forth above, Point I.B.I.,

failure to investigate constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel since the failure cripples counsel's ability to make
intelligent choices about the presentation of evidence, and
strategic choices at trial.
In this matter, the necessary investigation should have been
obvious to Gordon.
available.

In addition, the information was readily

For example, Gordon could have discovered the

information pursuant to the Government Records Access and
Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, et. seq. (1993) .
(See R. 792.)

Because Gordon failed to investigate Waldron's

history, he failed to present important credibility evidence at
trial. Gordon's performance was so seriously deficient that
counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
3. Since Waldron Was the Only Witness to Link Maestas to
the Transaction, Gordon's Failure to Place Waldron's
Credibility in Issue Prejudiced Maestas.
(

Maestas is required to show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.

This requires showing that counsel's

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
i

trial. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the ability to
attack a witness' credibility on cross-examination is an
important part of the right of confrontation, guaranteed by
i
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Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the Sixth
Amendment of the federal constitution.
1233.

Chestnut, 621 P.2d at

An attack on credibility means an attack on the substance

of the witness' testimony.

Also, "[t]he jury's estimate of the

truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence." Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264, 269 (1959) .
Here, Waldron's testimony was extremely important since he
was the only witness to directly link Maestas to the drug transaction.

An attack on Waldron's credibility as a witness and on

his motives would have had an important impact on the jury.
In Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188, the Utah Supreme Court
considered defense counsel's failure to investigate the
availability and testimony of certain witnesses, who would have
presented information impacting on the credibility of the state's
key witness. There, the Court ruled that the information was
important because the key witness was the only person to offer
"direct evidence of defendant's guilt."

Id.

"In reviewing this

testimony, it is important to note that because it affects the
credibility of the only witness who gave direct evidence of
defendant's guilt, the testimony affects the "entire evidentiary
picture.'" Id.
Likewise, in this matter, the jury's verdict might have been
different had the jury known the extent of Waldron's character
for dishonesty and the extent of his motivation to implicate
Maestas in the transaction. This case should be reversed and re23

manded for a new trial since counsel's performance was deficient.
POINT II. THE FACTS FAIL TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS
FINDINGS THAT MAESTAS WILLFULLY VIOLATED PROBATION; THUS,
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVOKING PROBATION.
After the conviction in this matter, the trial court ordered
that it would stay Maestas1 prison sentence in order that Maestas
may participate in a rehabilitation program.

The minute entry

reflecting that order states the following: "The court defers
sentencing until the defendant can be evaluated by Odyssey House
to determine if he is appropriate for this program. If the
defendant does not meet Odyssey House treatment program's
criteria for acceptance for the program, then Mr. Gordon is
instructed by this court to find another alternative program
which will meet Judge Murphy's approval."

(R. 98; see also 101.)

Thereafter, Odyssey House accepted Maestas as a candidate
for the program (R. 594) and the judge stayed the prison sentence
on the following terms and conditions:
The period of probation will be 36 months. During the 36
months you are to pay the fine, the surcharge, and any
restitution, and there may not be any, in accordance with
the schedule set up with Adult Probation and Parole.
You are to enter into and complete the Odyssey House
program and any after-care. You're not to use any unlawful
drugs. You are not [to] associate with persons who
unlawfully use or who are known to unlawfully distribute or
use drugs.
You are not to frequent places where drugs are known to
be distributed or used. You are to submit your person to
testing for the presence of unlawful drugs in your bloodstream. [You are] to submit your person, your effects, your
residence to search and seizure for the unlawful drugs.
You are to serve eleven months in the Salt Lake County
Jail. I set that at eleven months just so I can comply with
consent decree or assist the county in complying with the
consent [decree]. But it should be noted specifically that
you are to be released to AP&P for transportation to the
24

Odyssey House once a bed is available for you.
(R. 597-98.)
On June 2, 1994, Maestas began his residency at Odyssey
House.

On June 24, 1994, the state filed a Progress/Violation

Report asserting the following:
[Maestas] had become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun
attacking staff and personnel at Odyssey House. The
defendant was rushed to the University of Utah Medical
Center for medical assistance. The University of Utah staff
indicated nothing could be done for the defendant. Odyssey
House personnel has requested the defendant be removed
immediately from the program. Due to the defendant's
criminal history this agency is requesting a No-Bail Bench
Warrant be issued to hold the defendant pending an Order to
Show Cause Hearing.
(R. 110.)

The affidavit filed in support of the violation report

stated simply that

,f

[t]he defendant has failed to participate and

comply to the conditions set forth by the Odyssey House program,
which resulted in his removal from said program on June 23, 1994,
in violation of condition number 11.5 of the defendant's Probation
Agreement and the Court's order." (R. 117-18.)
During the hearing on the matter, the state was required to
provide

sufficient

probation.

evidence to support a willful violation of

State v. Hodges. 798 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1990).

The prosecutor called two witnesses to testify: Tracy Anderson, the
clinical director of the Odyssey House program, and Albert Nieto,
a counselor for the program. The facts "viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court's findings" are set forth herein.
State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1991).
Anderson testified that during the first stage of treatment in
the program, residents are informed of the rules and tested over a
25

thirty-day period to determine whether they can conform to those
rules.

(R. 614.) Anderson testified that in his opinion, Maestas

had the ability to comply with the rules. (R. 621.)
Shortly after Maestas began with the program, "some problems"
arose. (R. 615.)

Anderson described the situation as follows:

He had difficulty with his impulse control.
He got
escalated on two or three occasions. We're set up to deal with
sort of minor anger problems, but he got fairly escalated on
one occasion and made some comments about - actually Albert,
the other person who is here, knows that a little better. But
at any rate, he said that he wanted to kill himself.
On a couple of different occasions, we had to put him on
what's called a suicide watch.
We're not a psychiatric
facility, and we're not set up 24 hours a day with doctors, so
we have to provide a service basically, which is difficult to
do, and that's watch the person 24 hours a day. At one point
[Maestas] was also taken by Albert Nieto and another one of
the clinicians up to the University of Utah Hospital Emergency
Room because of the ideation that he had about hurting
himself, running in the street, letting someone run over him.
At one point I think he made a comment that if he got out
he was going to assault his ex-wife.

'

<

i

(R. 615-16.) Anderson testified that the Odyssey House program had
very specific rules about "suicide ideation."
time

with

Tony,

and

delineated

to

him

"I personally spent

that

if

the

behavior

continued that he will not be able to stay in the program.
days later it was back and in force."

Two

(R. 616.)

Anderson testified that he took Maestas' suicide threat "as
i

real" and he considered the matter to be "a serious affair." (R.
616.)

Anderson informed Maestas "very clearly" that he "want[ed

Maestas] to tell me if [he was] having the thoughts, but if the
i

behavior and the thoughts continue and get out of hand we'll not be
able

to

treat

psychiatric

[Maestas]

setting."

in this

setting

(R. 618.) Anderson

because

we're

testified

not

that

a

the
i
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Odyssey House program was not equipped to deal with such mental
health issues.

(R. 618-19.)

Clearly, we're not a psychiatric facility. There are a number
of hours during - there are hours in the facility in which
there's not a professional doctor or clinician there. There
are people on call. So if a person is suicidal or is
gesturing, having difficulties that way, or if - well, in that
respect, if that's occurring, they need to be watched by
someone in the facility. And that's usually done by an upper
level resident, meaning someone who's been in the facility
quite some time, a level four.
(R. 620.) The problems related only to the mental health issues (R.
622-25) ; Maestas broke no other rules and was able to comply with
the written/specific rules of the program. (R. 619; 621; 623-24.)
Significantly, Anderson offered only the following testimony
with respect to whether Maestas had "manipulated" the system or
otherwise willfully failed to make a "bona fide" effort to comply
with the Odyssey House rules: He stated that he considered the
suicide threat to be "real" and that it was "a serious affair."
(R. 616.) The fact that staff members transported Maestas to the
University of Utah Medical Center emergency room further supports
the seriousness and reality of the situation.
With respect to Nieto's testimony, he described the situation
as follows:
We had had a graduation party for the graduates of the
program, and on that day - where the location of the party was
at a park on the west side of town.
And according to Tony, his ex-wife lives across the
street from the park, which he had gotten very emotional over
it. Upon returning to the facility, he had trouble throughout
the whole [day] that way. Upon returning to the facility he
demanded to talk to me, and which we went into one of the
offices, and had a discussion where he began to escalate.
He didn't want to hear what was being said to him, in
terms of just slowing down, and things can be taken care of,
but we can't do nothing right now, per se. And at that point
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it - another what we call all - group, where he has a peer
present, I decided to turn it into a group situation rather
than a one-on-one. Or actually, there was another counselor
involved.
I got Tony and one of his peers during that time to run
a group with him and try to de-escalate the situation, and so
that his peers could be aware of what was going on with Tony,
and this could become a group issue.
At that point during that group is when the suicide
ideation was made present by Tony.
(R. 627-28.)

According to Nieto, at that point Maestas was placed

on suicide watch and eventually taken to the University of Utah
Medical Center. (R. 628-29.)
Nieto

testified

that

after

doctors

checked for ulcers, they discharged him.

examined
(R. 629.)

Maestas

and

Maestas was

returned to the Odyssey House and the suicide threats continued.
(R. 629-30.)

Because the Odyssey House was not equipped to handle

such problems, the staff determined the program could not serve
Maestas. (R. 63 0.)

The trial court continued Nieto's examination

as follows:
[COURT:] Did you perceive any of Mr. Maestas's acting out as
being manipulative?
[NIETO:] I would say that at first, I would say so, yes. As
it continued, I would have to say no.
[COURT:] And is that because after he initially began it he
then found himself in such a frenzy? Would that be a fair
statement?
[NIETO:] You're - regarding his escalation and his - yes. Yes.
(R. 632.)
ulcers,
problem.

Nieto admitted that Maestas also had complained about

but

that

the

Subsequently,

staff

had not

the staff

checked

learned that

suffered ulcers that apparently went untreated.

into

the

medical

in fact Maestas
(R. 629; 633-34.)

With respect to whether Maestas willfully violated a rule,
Nieto's

testimony

supports

that
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he

did

not.

Both

witnesses

acknowledged that the program could handle some level of "suicidal
ideation, " but that if it continued, the resident would not be
allowed to participate in the program.

(R. 618-20.)

As the evidence reflects, Nieto believed that Maestas was not
manipulative. (R. 632-33.) Simply, the Odyssey House program was
not able to treat or monitor the mental health and medical issues
presented by Maestas.
Notwithstanding Nieto and Anderson's testimony on the matter,
and the absence of any facts to support the determination that
Maestas willfully violated Odyssey House rules, the trial judge
found the following:
The Court finds there has been a violation of the terms
of the conditions of probation. That violation was knowing
and intentional under circumstances where the defendant had
the ability to comply with the Court's order on the conditions
of probation. Therefore probation will be revoked. It will
not be reinstated. There are only so many chances that the
Court has the disposition or the opportunity to grant them in
one case and deny them in another because there are only
limited resources out there. We need to provide those
resources to the people who have indicated they will take
advantage of that. And that is not so in this case.
(R. 653.) The trial court found a willful violation of the terms of
probation. The trial court abused its discretion in making such a
finding since the evidence is insufficient to support it.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 1994),
probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court. This Court has ruled that such discretion may be exercised
only in cases where defendant has willfully violated the conditions
of his parole. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277.
In Hodges, defendant was placed on probation and ordered to
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participate in and successfully complete the sex offender program
at the Bonneville Community Correctional Center.
into

the

defendant's

participation

Id. Eight months

in the program,

the

staff

concluded he was not making sufficient progress in treatment, and
requested

an order to show cause why probation

revoked.

Id.

should not be

State witnesses testified that defendant had "physical and
mental problems that interfered with his ability to effectively
i

participate in treatment." Id. at 272.
for

the

state

testified

that

In that case, one witness

defendant's

related to his "manipulative behavior."

Id.

lack

of

improvement

Other than that, "no

specific instances of undesirable behavior or non-compliance with
Bonneville program rules were described."

Id.

The trial court

revoked probation and this Court reversed and remanded the case for
I
further findings regarding the matter.

In reversing the case, the

Court "address[ed] the question of what evidence may be sufficient
to

justify

the

modification

or

revocation

of

appellant's
I

probation." Id. at 275.
Specifically, this Court ruled that "in order to revoke
probation, a violation of a probation condition must, as a
(

general rule, be willful." Id. at 276.

Where defendant's failure

to progress in the program is beyond his control, probation
cannot be revoked "unless it is also found that, because of this
i

failure, appellant poses a present danger to others."

Id. at

(
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277.1

A finding of willfulness "merely requires a finding that

the probationer did not make bona
conditions of his probation."

fide

efforts to meet the

State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989,

991 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 84).
In this matter, the evidence presented at the order to show
cause proceeding was insufficient to support a willful violation.
Instead, the evidence supported that Maestas made bona fide
efforts to meet the conditions of his probation, but suffered
medical and mental issues that were beyond his control and not
treatable in the Odyssey House program.
In other cases, this Court has found a "willful" violation
under the following circumstances: In Peterson, 869 P.2d at 99192, defendant failed to obtain full-time employment. Rather, he
started up his own business without authority, and only worked on
and off as he wanted to. In addition, defendant failed to make
Jbona fide

efforts toward paying the fine associated with the

punishment. Id.
In Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 83, after defendant was ordered as
a condition of probation to maintain full-time employment, he
obtained employment at the Red Lion Hotel, then voluntarily quit
his job when he was accused of stealing eyeglasses. The trial
court determined the voluntary termination was willful, and the
willful violation continued since there were jobs available in
Salt Lake during the period of defendant's probation and
1

The trial court did not find that Maestas was a present
danger to others. Thus, that is not an issue in this case.
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defendant failed to secure a job.

id.

In State v. Ruesaa. 851 P.2d 1229, 1231-33 (Utah App. 1993),
the defendant refused to sign the probation agreement that would
initiate probation, "despite warning by the court."

Id.

Maestas1 case is similar to Hodges, where the record
reflects Maestas suffered medical and mental issues beyond his
control. The issues were important enough to prompt the staff to
transport Maestas to the hospital. The witnesses for the state
i

testified that Maestas otherwise was capable of complying with
the rules, and that Maestas was not manipulating the system.
Because the issues were beyond Maestas' control, the program
could not facilitate his needs. The alleged violation was not
"willful." The trial court's finding to that effect is
insupportable and clearly erroneous.
I
Nothing in the record supports the determination that
Maestas failed to make a bona fide effort to work within the
parameters of the Odyssey House program.

In accordance with the
1

cases concerning probation revocation, the evidence was insufficient to support a willful violation. The trial court abused
its discretion in terminating Maestas' probation. This case
i

should be reversed on that basis.
POINT III. THE ARREST IN THIS CASE VIOLATED UTAH LAW;
CONSEQUENTLY, IT CANNOT SERVE TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
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I

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Utah counterpart is identical in relevant part to the federal
provision and is given as much, if not more, force.

Utah Const.

Art. I, sec. 14; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-68 (Utah
1990); accord State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991). 2
Unless officers have secured a valid warrant to search,
under the federal and state constitutional provisions the search
is per se unreasonable -- "subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. U.S., 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586
(1980) (warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively
unreasonable); Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 571 (recognizing warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under art. I, sec. 14); State v.
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Utah App. 1988).
Also, where officers fail to procure a warrant, "[t]he State
carries the burden of showing that a warrantless search was
lawful."

Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (citations omitted); see also

State v. James, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah App. 1999) (the
state carries the burden of establishing that the trooper's
action was lawful); State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App.

In determining whether the warrantless search was
justified, the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and
Art. I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution are equally persuasive, and
compel the determination that the evidence seized in this case
must be suppressed. Maestas is not seeking a distinct analysis
under Art. I, § 14 .
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1993); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Utah App. 1991).
In this matter, the trial court justified the warrantless
i

search as "incident to arrest."

(R. 285.) Because the state

failed to establish that the arrest was lawful, the warrantless
search cannot be upheld as set forth below.
i

A.

THE ARREST VIOLATED UTAH LAW.

As set forth above, this matter involved an operation
initiated by the DOC.

Correctional officers determined to stop

drug trafficking in the prison by focusing on persons outside the
correctional facility who were suspected of supplying drugs to
inmates.

(R. 255-56; 358-59; 374.)

Officials identified
i

specific persons as the offending suppliers, and organized a drug
purchase focusing on those persons in order to arrest them and to
end the trafficking. (R. 239; 266-68; 284; 362-63; 385.)

The

correctional officers recruited Waldron to organize buys with
identified suppliers during an undercover operation in March
1992. (R. 255; 358-59; 374.)
i

At some point during the undercover operation, it became
apparent to correctional officers that identified suppliers were
not available, and/or were not able to provide drugs. (R. 234;
239; 361-62.) Thus, the operation diverted, and officials allowed
Waldron to arrange a purchase from Maestas. Nothing in the record
supports that Maestas was an intended target of the operation. In
fact, correctional officers admitted the operation "had nothing
to do with Maestas" (R. 239; see also 266-68; 362-63; 385), and
the trial judge found that Maestas' involvement in the matter was
(
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"an accidental happening."

(R. 284.)

Thus, at the time that

correctional officers diverted from their intended operation,
they were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah
law.
Utah statutory law in effect in 1992 governed the DOC and
its operations outside correctional facilities.

Section 64-13-6

recognized that the "primary purposes" of the DOC were to protect
the public by caring for and confining offenders; implementing
court-ordered punishment for offenders; providing programs to
assist offenders; managing programs to take into account "the
needs and interests of victims, where reasonable"; and
supervising probationers and parolees. Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-6
(Supp. 1992) .3 An "offender" was defined as a person who had been
convicted of a crime for which he may be committed to the custody
of the DOC. Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-1(8) (Supp. 1992). 4

3

In 1993, that provision was amended to include the
following additional duties: "the department shall:" "investigate
criminal conduct involving offenders incarcerated in a state
correctional facility;" and "cooperate and exchange information
with other state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies to
achieve greater success in prevention and detection of crime and
apprehension of criminals."
4

In 1993, the statutes were amended to include an
additional, substantive statute, identified as Section 64-1321.5. It states the following:
(1) Employees of the department who are designated by the
executive director as correctional officers may exercise the
powers and authority of a peace officer only when needed
to

properly

carry out the following

functions:

(a) performing the officer's duties within the boundaries of
a correctional facility;
(b) supervising an offender during transportation;
(c) when in fresh pursuit of an offender who has escaped
(continued...)
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The "duties" of the DOC were specifically limited to
management of adjudicated offenders and the operation of
i

correctional facilities as follows: "The department shall provide
probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs,
correctional facilities, community correctional centers, and
<

other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to
accomplish its purposes."

Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-10 (Supp.

1992) .
i

Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-12 also allowed the DOC to assist
county sheriffs "in the development of jail standards, in the
review of jail facilities," and in providing "other services as
i

requested by the sheriffs."

Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-12 (Supp.

1992) .
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-la-l and 77-la-2 specified that a
i

"corrections officer" only had "peace officer authority" while

(...continued)
from the custody of the department; or
(d) when requested to assist a local, state or federal law
enforcement agency.
(2) Employees of the department who are POST certified and
who are designated as correctional enforcement or
investigation officers are peace officers and may have the
following duties, as specified by the executive director:
(a) providing investigative services for the department;
(b) conducting criminal investigations and operations in
cooperation with state, local, and federal law enforcement
agencies; and
(c) providing security and enforcement for the department.
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-21.5 (1993). Utah statutory law
specifically provides that unless newly enacted legislation
specifies that it shall be applied retroactively, such
legislation may be applied only prospectively. Utah Code Ann. §
68-3-3 (1996) . Since Section 64-13-21.5 was not in effect at the
time of the alleged offense in this case, it does not apply in
this matter.
36

(

(

i

(

engaged in the performance of his duties. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77la-1 (Supp. 1992) and 77-la-2 (1990).
The Utah Legislature amended Utah law governing the duties
of the DOC in 1993.

See notes 3, and 4, herein. Because the

events giving rise to the matter in this case occurred in 1992,
the law in effect at that time is applicable to this Court's
analysis.

See State v. Fixel. 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987). 5

In 1992, Utah statutory law did not authorize correctional
officers to conduct criminal investigations or operations outside
correctional facilities.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-13-1, et. seg.

(1986 & Supp. 1992); see also Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368 (statutory
sections encompass the total spectrum of a police officer's acts
and authority).

By engaging in such an operation, the

correctional officers in this case acted outside the scope of
their authority in violation of the law. Fixel supports such a
determination.
In Fixel, a Provo City police officer arranged and
participated in a drug transactions in Pleasant Grove, Utah.
When the transaction was completed, "[a]n arrest warrant was

In Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1366, the Utah Supreme Court
considered whether an officer acted beyond the scope of his
authority under Utah statutory law, where the officer conducted
an undercover drug transaction outside his jurisdiction. The
Court applied the statutes in effect at the time of the
transaction, and noted that statutory amendments to the
provisions became effective one month thereafter. Id. The court
did not consider the effect of the later amendments.
As in Fixel, the statutes in effect at the time of the DOC
undercover operation in this case must be considered to determine
if officers acted outside the scope of their statutory authority
in arresting Maestas.
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later issued, and defendant was arrested and charged twice for
distributing a controlled substance for value." Id. at 1367.
Defendant argued that because the officer involved in the
transaction was outside his jurisdictional limits at the time of
the purchase, he acted beyond the scope of his authority.

Id.

The state countered defendant's argument by asserting that the
statutes governing peace officer conduct did not apply because
the officer "acted as a private citizen when he participated in
the drug transactions."
persuaded."

The Utah Supreme Court was "not

Id. at 1368.

The court recognized that Utah statutory law encompassed
"the total spectrum of a police officer's acts and authority."
Id.

In that regard,
[Officer] Guinn was discharging the functions of his office,
and in doing so, his activities involved the exercise of his
official duties and authority. Indeed, the record indicates
that Guinn was on duty during the time he participated in at
least the first drug transaction. Moreover, Guinn himself
testified that on both occasions, he was operating in his
official capacity as an undercover police officer assigned
to investigate narcotics offenses. As such, he was
conducting an authorized official investigation. He filed
reports and apparently advised his supervisor of the two
transactions. He also delivered the contraband to a superior
at regularly scheduled meetings.
In light of the above, we cannot sanction the State's
approach of avoiding the intended statutory proscriptions by
conveniently classifying Guinn's investigation as that of a
private citizen without the mantle of police authority. We
conclude, therefore, that Guinn clearly acted outside the
scope of his statutory authority when he conducted the
investigations in Pleasant Grove.

Id.

Pursuant to Fixel and the Utah statutory law in effect at

the time of the undercover operation in Maestas' case, the
correctional officers were acting outside the scope of their
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statutory authority at the time of Maestas1 arrest. The
warrantless arrest was invalid since the officers lacked
authority to participate in the operation and/or to make the
arrest. The search cannot be upheld as incident to the illegal
arrest.
B.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

Since the warrantless, unlawful arrest served as the basis
for justifying the warrantless search, the exclusionary rule is
appropriate as a remedy. Maestas has raised this issue on appeal
as a Fourth Amendment violation, and he specifically is
challenging the validity of the arrest as the basis for the
search.

Thus, suppression of the evidence confiscated in

connection with the warrantless search is appropriate.
Suppression is automatic in the search-and-seizure context
since the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary rule "is to deter
future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the 4th Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures."

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974)(quoting

U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). The exclusionary
rule applies when police have engaged in willful or negligent,
unlawful conduct. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.

Such conduct existed

here.
In Fixel, since the defendant did not claim that the officer
violated a constitutional right, or that the arrest was invalid,
the Utah Supreme Court was unwilling to automatically apply the
exclusionary rule as an appropriate remedy. "Defendant does not
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argue or show that the later arrest failed to satisfy section 779-3 or that it was otherwise unlawful.

His claim is limited to

the officer's conduct in making the drug buys.

We reject any

suggestion that the buys in this case were the equivalent of an
official search by the police." Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369 n. 10.
Although the court did not apply the exclusionary rule in
Fixel, it ruled that suppression of the evidence would serve as a
remedy for a statutory violation under the following
circumstances.
Only a "fundamental" violation of [a rule of criminal
procedure] requires automatic suppression, and a violation
is "fundamental" only where it, in effect, renders the
search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment
standards. Where the alleged violation ... is not
"fundamental" suppression is required only where:
(1) there was "prejudice" in the sense that the search might
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the
[r]ule had been followed, or

(2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate
disregard of a provision of the[r]ule...
... It is only where the violation also implicates
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in badfaith or has substantially prejudiced the defendant that
exclusion may be an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 1368-69 (alterations in original; notes omitted) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421 (Pa. 1985)). This Court has
identified the above analysis as the ""persuasive1 standard."
State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 410 (Utah App. 1994).
Again, Maestas maintains that the exclusionary rule
automatically applies in this case since the unlawful arrest
served as the basis for justifying the warrantless search.
the analysis under the "persuasive standard" in Fixel is not
relevant.

To the extent this Court determines the Fixel,
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Thus,

persuasive-standard analysis applies, the evidence in this case
should have been suppressed for at least two reasons.
First, "the search might not have occurred" if the statutes
had been followed. Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-69.

Since statutory

law did not permit officers to engage in the undercover operation
outside the correctional facility, if officers had followed the
law, the undercover operation would not have occurred, and
Maestas never would have been searched.
To the extent such an operation by the DOC was permissible
for the purpose of ending drug trafficking in the prison, the
officers exceeded the scope of their authority when they involved
Maestas in the transaction, since he was not a targeted supplier.
That is, since Maestas was not a target of the operation, but was
an "accidental happening" (R. 284), correctional officers either
should have terminated the operation when it diverted from its
intended purpose, or obtained the cooperation of the local law
enforcement.

There is no evidence that any local law agency was

involved in or aware of, or would have approved the undercover
operation.

Thus, again, the search would not have occurred if

officers had followed the law.
In other cases concerning application of the "persuasive
standard," Utah appellate courts have been unwilling to find that
under the circumstances, "the search might not have occurred."
Those cases are distinguishable as follows.
In State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that under the Fixel "persuasive standard,"
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suppression was not an appropriate remedy in that case for
violations of the statute authorizing nighttime searches.

In

that case, the magistrate issued a warrant to search a thirdperson's apartment.

The warrant was supported by an affidavit

that failed to contain sufficient evidence to support the
1

nighttime search provision.

Id. at 428-29. The magistrate also

issued a proper arrest warrant that permitted entry into the
apartment during nighttime hours to arrest the third person.
11

[0] nly the timing of the actual search of the apartment was

improperly authorized." Id. at 430.
In considering the "persuasive standard" and whether the
i

search otherwise would have occurred if the rule had been
followed, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
In order to show prejudice, defendant must establish that
absent the nighttime entry, "the search would not otherwise
have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule
had been followed." Defendant has shown no such prejudice.
Even without the erroneous inclusion of nighttime search
authority, the officers had authority to enter [the thirdperson's apartment] during nighttime hours pursuant to a
valid arrest warrant. The magistrate's erroneous approval
of nighttime search authority for [the third-person's home]
was harmless, as the officers could have rightfully taken
steps to secure the house pursuant to the arrest warrant, to
ask defendant to leave the house, and to search the house in
the daylight hours. The erroneous issuance of the warrant
did not therefore prejudice defendant, whose property would
have been searched regardless of the time of the warrant's
execution.
Rowe, 850 P.2d at 430 (footnotes omitted).

(

<

i

"The holding in

Rowe [] turned on the fact that the officers possessed a daytime
search warrant, and a day or nighttime arrest warrant.

i

In short,

the officers essentially were authorized to enter the dwelling at
any time to arrest an occupant and to secure the premises."
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i

State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 618 (Utah App. 1993).

Thus, the

defendant in Rowe could not show prejudice under Fixel.
In Simmons, defendants argued that the warrant failed to
comply with statutory requirements authorizing nighttime
searches, but that the warrant otherwise was valid.

Because the

defendants did not assert that the search would not have occurred
if officers had complied with the law, this Court ruled that the
defendants failed to show prejudice.

Id. at 618.

In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), defendant argued
the search was unlawful because the officers failed to knock and
announce their presence in executing the otherwise appropriate
search warrant.

According to the defendant, such conduct

violated Utah statutory law concerning the execution of a search
warrant, and the violation required suppression of the evidence
obtained in connection with the search.

The Utah Supreme Court

determined the officers violated the statute, but refused to
suppress the evidence under an analysis similar to the
"persuasive standard"; the court found that the search would have
occurred even if officers had executed the warrant in accordance
with Utah statutory law:
Here, there was no claim that either the fact of entry or
the search and seizure was otherwise unlawful. The claim is
only that the manner of entry was unlawful. However, the
manner of entry in this case had nothing to do with the
extent of the intrusion on defendant's privacy. The officers
had a search warrant and executed it on the same day it was
obtained. Although their unannounced entry was not
authorized by the warrant, it did not contribute appreciably
to the invasion of privacy already authorized by the
warrant. Furthermore, the officers made a proper
announcement and gave proper notice when Buck arrived on the
scene. Under the circumstances, the officers' conduct was
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not unreasonable, and the trial court did not err in
refusing to suppress the evidence seized.
*

Id. at 703 (cites and footnotes omitted).
In Maestas1 case, if officers had complied with Utah
statutory law, the search never would have occurred.

The

officers did not otherwise have statutory or other authority to
proceed with the undercover operation involving Maestas.

\

Under

Utah law, officers should have terminated the operation before it
exceeded statutory limits.

Compliance with Utah law would have

I

terminated the operation before Maestas' involvement in the
matter. Under the analysis in Fixel, Maestas has shown that the
search would not have occurred if the law had been followed.

See

4

Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368.
Second, "there is evidence of intentional and deliberate
disregard of a provision of the rule."

Id. at 1368-69. The

1

evidence supports that prior to Waldron's alleged transaction
with Maestas, officers knew that Waldron was having difficulties
arranging a purchase from targeted suppliers, and they knew that

i

Maestas was not a target of the operation. (See R. 239.) The
officers' knowledge and continued involvement in the operation
without advising local law enforcement agencies supports an

4

intentional and deliberate disregard for the statutory law. Since
the arrest was unlawful in this case and the evidence supports
application of the exclusionary rule, the evidence obtained

4

during the warrantless search should have been suppressed.
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR
APPEAL.

i
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The defense in this case raised the issue of the legality of
the arrest in the trial court prior to re-sentencing. (Case No.
950902479 at 160-62.) The trial court specifically refused to
address the matter, and ordered Maestas to raise the issue on
appeal for a determination by this Court. (See R. 677-78; 686-88;
690; 718; 730; 734-35.)

Inasmuch as Maestas raised the issue in

the trial court, it is properly preserved.

The trial court erred

in failing to address the matter.
In the event this Court determines that the issue was not
properly preserved for purposes of appeal, Maestas asserts
ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error.

This Court

may reach the merits of the warrantless search under those
doctrines.
1. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error in Failing to
Suppress Evidence Confiscated in Connection with the
Warrantless Search.
The plain-error doctrine considers whether the trial court
failed to comply with the plain requirements of the law.
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not
properly objected to, the appellant must show the following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful,
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. []
See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v.
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Fontana, 680
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984); see also fState v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989)]; cf^ Utah R. Evid. 103(d);
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). If any one of these requirements is
not met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); Verde, 770 P.2d at 123.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). In this case,
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the trial court committed plain error in failing to suppress the
evidence where the arrest was unlawful.
First, for the reasons set forth above, Point III.A., an
error existed. Utah statutory provisions and case law plainly
provide that an officer engaged in an undercover operation
outside his jurisdiction is acting outside the scope of his
authority. Since the officers here were acting outside the scope
of their authority, the warrantless arrest was unlawful. The
unlawful arrest invalidates the warrantless search.
Second, the error was obvious. The plain statutory law and
Fixel, reflect that officers in this matter acted beyond the
scope of their authority in involving Maestas in the undercover
operation.

In addition, the trial judge in this case sat through

the evidentiary hearing concerning suppression of the evidence.
The judge asked the officers particular questions going to the
statutory "scope-of-authority," and concerning Maestas' involvement in the matter. Specifically, the judge asked the following:
[COURT]: Who was the target or targets of your
investigation?
[OFFICER LUCEY]: The original targets were involved within
the facility who'd been using this informant to mule
narcotics into the facility.
[COURT]: And by "facility," you're talking about the
corrections facility?
[LUCEY]: Utah State Prison, yes. And their agents on the
street.
•

*

*

[COURT]: What was the Department of Corrections doing
involved in this [operation]?
[OFFICER ALLEN]: My understanding, the [confidential
informant] had agreed to purchase cocaine and other
narcotics from several individuals that day. He was
released from the prison and was being monitored by the
Department of Corrections to make these purchases.
[COURT]: Well, did you have any information which indicated
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that any of the purported or proposed sellers knew that they
were selling to an inmate of the prison, and therefore the
drugs would likely end up in the prison?
[ALLEN]: I [knew] earlier there [were] a couple of
conversations with the individual that day, talking about
that he was from the prison. One of the individuals that we
talked to earlier that day had talked about how they get it
back in the prison. But I [COURT]: Did you hear anything over this wire that indicated
anything to you from this transaction, in which it's claimed
Mr. Maestas sold drugs to the informant, that indicated Mr.
Maestas knew that the confidential informant was an inmate
at the prison or that the drugs would likely end up in the
prison?
[ALLEN]: I don't think there was any conversation that they
would likely end up in the prison. I think that there was a
conversation that he was an inmate on work release.
(R. 255-56; 266-68.)
The examination reflects that the judge was aware that by
involving Maestas in the operation, the officers were acting
outside the scope of authority, rendering their involvement in
the operation and the arrest invalid.

Indeed, the judge

specifically made a finding to that effect when he ruled that
Maestas' involvement in the undercover operation was an
"accidental happening." (R. 284.)

Further, at the conclusion of

the motion to suppress hearing, the judge expressed an interest
in resolving this issue, but did not intend to make it part of
the record. The judge stated the following to the prosecutor:
"... [C]an I speak to you generally in my office about the
Department of Corrections and the manner in which they go about
these things?" (R. 287.) The record reflects that the judge was
aware of the jurisdictional problems presented by the officers'
involvement of Maestas in the undercover operation.
With respect to the third prong of the plain-error analysis,
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in this case, the error was harmful since suppression of the
evidence would have substantially weakened the state's case. The
state would have been prevented from offering evidence concerning
the items confiscated in connection with the warrantless search,
and suppression would have rendered Sundquist's testimony
inadmissible. The state would be left without any evidence to
support the possession charge, and little evidence to support
distribution. Thus, this Court may conclude beyond a reasonable
i

doubt that if the evidence had been suppressed, there would have
been a very different result in this case. The error was harmful.
2. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Seek
Suppression of the Evidence on the Basis that the Arrest Was
Invalid.

(

As set forth above, Maestas was entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel.

See Point I.A., supra.

Trial counsel

failed to seek suppression during pre-trial proceedings of the
evidence on the basis that the arrest was unlawful since the
officers were acting outside the scope of their authority.

The
i

argument was obvious under Utah statutory and case law. See Point
III.C.l.

Because trial counsel failed to seek suppression of the

evidence on that basis, Maestas commenced a 65B proceeding
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (Case No. 950902479),
and he has been forced in this matter to argue plain error on
appeal. Trial counsel's failure to argue the matter was
i

deficient.
The record fails to support any possible tactical reason for
failing to raise the matter. " [W]here a defendant can show that
i
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there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's
deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is satisfied."
State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State
v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993)).

Trial counsel

could have requested suppression of the evidence at any time
prior to or during trial, on the basis that the arrest was
unlawful, thereby invalidating the search.
Because trial counsel failed to properly raise the matter,
Maestas has been prejudiced. He was prejudiced because the illegally obtained evidence was presented to the jury. Even if the
trial court had improperly denied the suppression motion, Maestas
is prejudiced by the heightened requirement that he show plain
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal.

This Court should

address the suppression issue de novo to alleviate the prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Maestas respectfully
requests reversal of the convictions in this matter, and remand
for further proceedings, as this Court may deem appropriate.
SUBMITTED this Z2~JL day of

<&UJ*JIX*J^

/ 1999.
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^
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

Tab A

CHAPTER 13
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS —
STATE PRISON
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-264 provides that Chapters 13 and 13a, the Department of Corrections, are repealed July 1, 1993.
Section
64-13-1.
64-13-2.
64-13-3.
64-13-6.
64-13-7.
64-13-7.5.
64-13-8.
64-13-9.
64-13-10.
64-13-12.
64-13-13.
64-13-14.
64-13-14.5.
64-13-14.7.
64-13-15.
64-13-16.
64-13-17.
64-13-19.
64-13-20.

Section
Definitions.
Creation of department.
Executive director.
Purposes of department.
Offenders in custody of department.
Persons in need of mental
health services — Contracts.
Designation
of
employee
powers.
Repealed.
Department duties.
Assistance to sheriffs.
Administrators.
Secure correctional facilities.
Limits of confinement place —
Release status — Work release.
Victim notification of offender's
release.
Property of offender — Storage
and disposal.
Inmate employment.
Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspondence.
Labor at correctional facilities.
Investigative services — Pre-

64-13-21.
64-13-22.
64-13-23.
64-13-24.
64-13-25.
64-13-26.
64-13-27.
64-13-28.
64-13-29.
64-13-30.
64-13-31.
64-13-32.
64-13-34.
64-13-35.
64-13-36.

sentence investigations and
diagnostic evaluations.
Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in community.
Repealed.
Offender's income and finances.
Standards for staff training.
Standards for programs.
Private providers of services.
Records — Access.
Hearings involving staff or offenders.
Violation of parole or probation
— Detention — Hearing.
Expenses incurred by offenders
— Payment to department.
Emergencies.
Discipline of offenders — Use of
force.
Safety of offenders.
Items prohibited in correctional
facilities — Penalties.
Testing of prisoners for AIDS
and HTV infection — Segregation — Medical care — Department authority.

64-13-1- Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Community correctional center" means a nonsecure correctional
facility operated by the department.
(2) "Correctional facility" means any facility operated by the department to house offenders, either in a secure or nonsecure setting.
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council.
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(5) "Emergency" means any riot, disturbance, homicide, inmate violence occurring in any correctional facility, or any situation that presents
immediate danger to the safety, security, and control of the department.
(6) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Corrections.
(7) "Inmate" means any person who is committed to the custody of the
department and who is housed at a correctional facility or at a county jail
at the request of the department.

(8) "Offender" means any person who has been convicted of a crime for
which he may be committed to the custody of the department and is at
least one of the following:
(a) committed to the custody of the department;
(b) on probation; or
(c) on parole.
(9) "Secure correctional facility" means any prison, penitentiary, or
other institution operated by the department or under contract for the
confinement of offenders, where force may be used to restrain them if they
attempt to leave the institution without authorization.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 1; 1989,
ch. 224, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment added present Subsections (1), (2) and (6)
through (8), and redesignated former Subsec-

tions (1) and (2) as present Subsections (4) and
(5).
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, added present Subsection (5) and redesignated former Subsections (5) to (8) as Subsections (6) to (9).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.JLR. — State prisoner's right to personally
appear at civil trial to which he is a party—
state court cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1063.
Validity, construction, application, and ef-

feet of Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, 42 USCS §§ 1997-1997J, 93 A.L.R. Fed.
706.

64-13-2. Creation of department.
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervision of the executive director of the department. The department is the state
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the
Department of Human Services.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-2, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 2; 1990, ch. 183, § 47.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

,

ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"Human Services" for "Social Services" at the
end of the second sentence.

64-13-3. Executive director.

'

(1) The executive director shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The executive director shall be experienced and knowledgeable in the
field of corrections and shall have training in criminology and penology.
(3) The governor shall establish the executive director's salary within the
salary range fixed by the Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, State Officer
Compensation.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 198, § 3; 1991, ch. 114, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1991, added Subsection
(3).

(

64-13-4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 64-13-4 (L. 1977, ch.
253, § 4), relating to the oath, bond and per

diem and expense allowances of board members, was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 102, § 17.

64-13-4.1. Creation of Corrections Advisory Council.
(1) There is created within the Department of Corrections a Corrections
Advisory Council consisting of seven members. Each member shall be appointed by the governor for a term of four years, with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Terms of the council members shall be staggered, with no more
than two terms expiring in any one year. Each council member shall be a
resident of the state. No more than four members may be from the same
political party and no member may hold any office connected with the Department of Corrections. A vacancy occurring on the council for any reason shall
be filled by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate for the
unexpired term of the vacated member.
(2) Membership of the council should be chosen to reflect:
(a) geographical distribution;
(b) expertise or personal experience with subject matters in the field of
corrections;
(c) diversity of opinion and political preference; and
(d) gender, cultural, and ethnic diversity.
(3) Council members may be appointed for no more than two consecutive
terms unless the governor deems an additional term is in the best interest of
the state.
(4) Council members serve in a part-time capacity and without salary, but
members shall receive a per diem allowance established by the director of the
Division of Finance and all actual and necessary expenses incurred in the
performance of official duties.
(5) A member of the council may not hold any other office in the government of the United States or of this state or of any municipal corporation
within the state.
(6) Any member may be removed at any time by the governor for official
misconduct, habitual or wilful neglect of duty, or for other good and sufficient
cause.
(7) A council member shall disclose any conflict of interest to the council
and if the conflict involves a direct or financial interest in either the subject
under consideration or an entity or asset that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of council action, the member shall refrain from voting on the
matter.
(8) Current members of the Board of Corrections shall continue in office as
members of the Corrections Advisory Council until expiration of their terms
and until their successors are chosen.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-4.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 4.
Cross-References. — Governor's appointive power, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 10.

Per diem rates and
§§ 63-1-14.5, 63-1-15.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 5.
Key Numbers. — Prisons *» 4.

travel

expenses,

64-13-5. Council duties.
(1) The Corrections Advisory Council shall review and make recommendations to the executive director of the Department of Corrections concerning:
(a) the role and responsibility of the department and its programs;
(b) existing and proposed policies of the department;
(c) the annual budget request for the department prior to submission to
the governor;
(d) development and implementation of master plans for the department's programs and facilities, including facility siting;
(e) any subject deemed appropriate by the council, except the council
may not become involved in administrative matters; and
(f) any subject concerning the department, as requested by the executive director.
(2) The council shall encourage citizen awareness and input regarding programs in the field of corrections.
(3) The council shall prepare an annual report for the governor and the
Legislature on the status of the department and its programs.
(4) The director of the department shall provide staff assistance and any
information necessary for the Corrections Advisory Council to fulfill its responsibilities under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 5.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 198, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-5, as

enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 5, creating
division of corrections, and enacts the above
section,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 5.
Key Numbers. — Prisons *» 4.

(

64-13-6. Purposes of department
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include:
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement,
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate;
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders;
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders;
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and interests of victims, where reasonable; and
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute and
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 2 .
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "purposes" for "purpose" and
"include" for "includes the following" in the introductory language; inserted "of offenders" in
Subsection (1); substituted "offenders" for "the
criminal offender for the purpose of maintaining a law-abiding and productive society" in
Subsection (2); substituted "program" for "re-

habilitation" and "for offenders" for Mto assist
the criminal offender in functioning as a lawabiding and productive member of society" in
Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (4),
which read "individualized treatment of the offender, and"; redesignated former Subsection
(5) as present Subsection (4); made punctuation changes and added "and" to the end, in
Subsection (4); and added present Subsection
(5).

64-13-7. Offenders in custody of department
All offenders committed for incarceration in a state correctional facility, for
supervision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in the
custody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and is
responsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders to
facilities or programs.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 2; 1987, ch. 116, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "correctional" for "prison" in
the first sentence.

64-13-7.5. Persons in need of mental health services —
Contracts.
(1) Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department determines that a person in its custody is in need of mental health services, the
department shall contract with the Division of Mental Health, local mental
health authorities, or the state hospital to provide mental health services for
that person. Those services may be provided at the Utah State Hospital or in
community programs provided by or under contract with the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or other public or private mental
health care providers.
(2) If the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or the
state hospital notifies the department that it is unable to provide mental
health services under Subsection (1), the department may contract with other
public or private mental health care providers to provide mental health services for persons in its custody.

History: C. 1953, 64-13-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 245, § 5; 1991, ch. 193, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Subsection (1) designation and added Subsection
(2); substituted "Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department determines
that a person m its cust^y is for For persons
m the custody of the department who the de-

partment has determined to be" and made a
stylistic change in the first sentence in Subsection (1); and inserted "or other public or priV ate mental health care providers" and made
related changes in the second sentence in Subsection (1).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 245, § 8
m a k e s t h e act effective on J u l

x

1989

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of state prison authorities to
administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs

to prisoner without his or her consent—state
cases, 75 A.L.R4th 1124.

64-13-8. Designation of employee powers.
The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the
authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and
other powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited
to the responsibility to bear firearms.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-8, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 3; 1987, ch. 116, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted the former first sentence; and

substituted "its" for "those" and "considers" for
"deems" and inserted "authority and" in the
remaining sentence,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for
negligent supervision of probationer, 44
A.L.R.4th 638.

64-13-9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals
§ 64-13-9, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211,

§ 4, relating to department services to other
agencies, effective April 27, 1987.

64-13-10. Department duties.
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs, correctional facilities, community correctional centers,
and other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to accomplish its
purposes.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 5; 1987, ch. 116, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "correctional" for "prison"

and "necessary and as required to accomplish
its purposes'for "required for the safe management of public offenders."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Constitutional right of prisoners
to abortion services and facilities — federal
s, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 683.

64-13-10.5, 64-13-11. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 90, § 2 repeals
§ 64-13-10.5, as enacted by L. 1987, ch. 157,
§ 2, relating to education of persons in custody
of Department of Corrections, contracting for
services, transfer of supplies, equipment, furniture, and budget, and joint committee, effective

April 27, 1992. For present comparable provisions, see § 53A-1-403.5.
Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 64-13-11,
as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, § 6, relating
to evaluation programs, effective April 27,
1987.

64-13-12. Assistance to sheriffs.
Where resources permit, the department may assist county sheriffs in the
development of jail standards, in the review of jail facilities, and shall provide
other services as requested by the sheriffs.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-12, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 7; 1987, ch. 116, § 6; 1988,
ch. 100, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided the section into subsections;
added frWhere resources permit" to the beginning of Subsection (1), substituted "may assist"
for "shall assist" and "in the review of jail facilities, and shall provide" for "review of facilities, and" and deleted "where available re-

sources permit" following "by the sheriffs" in
Subsection (1); and substituted "or for "for"
preceding "an offender" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1990,
deleted former Subsection (2), pertaining to reimbursement of a county for the incarceration
of a felon, and deleted the Subsection (1) designation from the remaining paragraph.

64-13-13. Administrators.
The executive director shall appoint deputy directors, wardens, regional
administrators, and other administrators as necessary to administer correctional programs. Deputy directors, wardens, and regional administrators shall
have experience in corrections, related criminal justice fields, law, or criminology, and experience in administration.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-13, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 8; 1987, ch. 116, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment inserted "wardens, regional administrators, and other administrators" and made a

punctuation change in the first sentence and
deleted the former second sentence, authorizing the appointment of regional administrators
and wardens.

64-13-14. Secure correctional facilities.
(1) The department shall maintain and operate secure correctional facilities for the incarceration of offenders.
For each compound of secure correctional facilities, as established by the
executive director, wardens shall be appointed as the chief administrative
officers by the executive director.
(2) The department may transfer offenders from one correctional facility to
another and may, with the consent of the sheriff, transfer any offender to a
county jail.

History: C. 1953, 64-13-14, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 9; 1987, ch. 116, § 8.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment rewrote this section.

64-13-14.5. Limits of confinement place — Release status
— Work release.
(1) The department may extend the limits of the place of confinement of an
inmate when, as established by department policies and procedures, there is
cause to believe the inmate will honor his trust, by authorizing him under
prescribed conditions:
(a) to leave temporarily for purposes specified by department policies
and procedures to visit specifically designated places for a period not to
exceed 30 days;
(b) to participate in a voluntary training program in the community
while housed at a correctional facility or to work at paid employment;
(c) to be housed in a nonsecure community correctional center operated
by the department; or
(d) to be housed in any other facility under contract with the department.
(2) The department shall establish rules governing offenders on release
status. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the
rules and to notify the department of the offender's discharge or other release
from a release program activity, or of any violation of the rules governing
release status.
(3) The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of
his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an institution or
facility designated by the department is an escape from custody.
(4) If an offender is arrested for the commission of a crime, the arresting
authority shall immediately notify the department of the arrest.
(5) The department may impose appropriate sanctions upon offenders who
violate rules, including prosecution for escape under Section 76-8-309 and for
unauthorized absence.
(6) An inmate who is housed at a nonsecure correctional facility and on
work release may not be required to work for less than the current federally
established minimum wage, or under substandard working conditions.
History: C. 1953,64-13-14.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 116, § 9.

64-13-14.7. Victim notification of offenders release.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Offender" means a person who committed an act of criminally
injurious conduct against the victim and has been sentenced to incarceration in the custody of the department.
(b) "Victim" means a person against whom an offender committed
criminally injurious conduct as defined in Section 63-63-2, and who is
entitled to notice of hearings regarding the offender's parole under Section 77-27-9.5. "Victim" includes the legal guardian of a victim, or the
representative of the family of a victim who is deceased.

(2) (a) A victim shall be notified of an offender's release under Section
64-13-14.5, or any other release to orfroma half-way house, to a program
outside of the prison such as a rehabilitation program, state hospital,
community center other than a release on parole, commutation or termination for which notice is provided under Section 77-27-9.5, transfer of
the offender to an out-of-state facility, or an offender's escape, upon submitting a signed written request of notification to the Department of
Corrections. The request shall include a current mailing address and may
include current telephone numbers if the victim chooses.
(b) The department shall advise the victim of an offender's release or
escape under Subsection (2)(a), in writing. However, if written notice is
not feasible because the release is immediate or the offender escapes, the
department shall make a reasonable attempt to notify the victim by telephone if the victim has provided a telephone number under Subsection
(2)(a) and shall follow up with a written notice.
(3) Notice of victim rights under this section shall be provided to the victim
in the notice of hearings regarding parole under Section 77-27-9.5. The department shall coordinate with the Board of Pardons to ensure the notice is
implemented.
(4) A victim's request for notification under this section and any notification to a victim under this section is private information that the department
may not release:
(a) to the offender under any circumstances; or
(b) to any other party without the written consent of the victim.
(5) The department may make rules as necessary to implement this section.
(6) The department or its employees acting within the scope of their employment are not civilly or criminally liable for failure to provide notice or
improper notice under this section unless the failure or impropriety is willful
or grossly negligent.
History: C. 1953,64-13-14.7, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 11, § 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 11 be-

came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

64-13-15. Property of offender — Storage and disposal.
(1) (a) Offenders may retain personal property at correctional facilities
only as authorized by the department. An offender's property which is
retained by the department shall be inventoried and placed in storage by
the department and a receipt for the property shall be issued to the offender. Offenders shall be required to arrange for disposal of property
retained by the department within a reasonable time under department
rules. Property retained by the department shall be returned to the offender at discharge, or in accordance with Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate
Code, in the case of death prior to discharge.
(b) If property is not claimed within one year of discharge, or it is not
disposed of by the offender within a reasonable time after the department's order to arrange for disposal, it becomes property of the state and
may be used for correctional purposes or donated to a charity within the
state.
(c) If an inmate's property is not claimed within one year of his death,
it becomes the property of the state in accordance with Section 75-2-105.

(d) Funds which are contraband and in the physical custody of any
prisoner, whether in the form of currency and coin which are legal tender
in any jurisdiction or negotiable instruments drawn upon a personal or
business account, shall be subject to forfeiture following a hearing which
accords with prevailing standards of due process. All such forfeited funds
shall be used by the department for purposes which promote the general
welfare of prisoners in the custody of the department. Money and negotiable instruments taken from offenders' mail under department rule and
which are not otherwise contraband shall be placed in an account administered by the department, to the credit of the offender who owns the
money or negotiable instruments.
(2) Upon discharge from a secure correctional facility, the department may
give an inmate transition funds in an amount established by the department
with the approval of the director of the Division of Finance. At its discretion,
the department may spend the funds directly on the purchase of necessities or
transportation for the discharged inmate.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-15, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 10; 1987, ch. 116, § 10; 1988,
ch. 191, § 1; 1991, ch. 124, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, in Subsection (1), substituted references
to "offender" for references to "inmate"
throughout the subsection, substituted "personal property at correctional facilities only as
authorized" for "property only as is authorized"
in the first sentence, made a punctuation
change in the third sentence, substituted "one
year" for "two years" and "and may be used for
correctional purposes or donated to a charity
within the state" for "consistent with the provisions of Chapter 44, Title 78" in the fourth sentence, and rewrote the last sentence; in Subsection (2), substituted "a secure correctional facility, the department may give an inmate" for
"prison, inmates shall receive" in the first sentence, substituted "its discretion, the department may spend the funds" for "the discretion
of the department, the funds may be spent" in
the second sentence, and added "for the discharged inmate" to the end of the subsection.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, in Subsection (1) divided the subsection

into the present paragraphs and added the designations; in Subsection (l)(a), inserted the
third sentence and, in the fourth sentence, substituted at the beginning "Property retained by
the department" for ? The property"; in Subsection (1Kb), inserted "or it is not disposed of by
the offender within a reasonable time"; and, in
Subsection (l)(c), deleted "held by the department" following "instruments" at the end of
the subsection.
The 1991 amendment, efifective April 29,
1991, substituted "shall be required" for "may
be required" in the third sentence and "in accordance with Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate
Code" for "to the offender's legal representative" in the fourth sentence in Subsection
(l)(a); deleted "death or" after "year of* and
inserted "after the department's order to arrange for disposal" in Subsection (1Kb); and
added present Subsection (l)(c) and the first
two sentences in Subsection (l)(d) making former Subsection (l)(c) the final sentence in Subsection ll)(d) and substituting "offenders' mail
under department rule and which are not otherwise contraband" for "offenders or from their
mail under department rule" therein.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison
regulation of inmates' possession of personal
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800.

64-13-16. Inmate employment.
. Unless incapable of employment because of sickness or other infirmity or
for security reasons, the department may employ inmates to the degree that
funding and available resources allow. An offender may not be employed on
work which benefits any employee or officer of the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-16, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 211, § 11; 1987, ch. 116, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "the department may employ
inmates to the degree that funding and available resources allow" for "inmates shall be em-

ployed on a regular basis, as is practicable" at
the end of the first sentence, substituted "An
offender may not" for "No inmate may" at the
beginning of the second sentence, and deleted
the former third, fourth, and last sentences,

64-13-17, Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspondence.
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general; judges of the
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advisory Council; members of the Board of Pardons; members of the Legislature; and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the
department or court order.
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with
any inmate without the consent of the department.
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a riot or
other disturbance.
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility,
other than under Subsection (1), without the consent of the department. Offenders and all visitors may be reqxiired to submit to a search or inspection of
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation.
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive correspondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is
subject to search, consistent with department rules.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-17, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 12; 1987, ch. 116, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided Subsection (1) into present Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) and added present
Subsection (l)(c); in Subsection (l)(a), substituted "correctional" for "state prison" near the
beginning of the subsection; in Subsection (2),
substituted "A person may not" for "No person
may", "offender at any correctional facility" for

"inmate", and "under" for "those provided for
in" in the first sentence, substituted "Offenders" for "Inmates" and deleted "exercising"
preceding "visitation" in the second sentence,
and deleted the former third sentence as set
out in the bound volume; and, in Subsection
(3), substituted "Offenders housed at any correctional facility" for "Inmates" in the first
sentence.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison
regulation of inmates' possession of personal
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800.

64-13-18. Sentence of incarceration.
The officer delivering any offender for incarceration shall deliver to the
department a certified copy of the sentence received by the officer from the
clerk of the court. The department shall give the officer a certificate of delivery and shall submit to the Board of Pardons a copy of the commitment order.
The certified copy of sentence is conclusive evidence of the facts contained in
itHistory: C. 1953, 64-13-18, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 13.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 211, § 13 repeals former § 64-13-18, as
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 18, relating

to repair of damaged property, and enacts the
above section.
Cross-References. Pardons and paroles,
Chapter 27 of Title 77.

64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities.
The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be produced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be
made for the labor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or supplies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods,
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-19, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 211, § 14; 1987, ch. 116, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "correctional facilities" for

"the prisons" at the end of the first sentence
and "offenders" for "inmates" in the second and
third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the
third sentence.

64-13-20. Investigative services — Presentence investigations and diagnostic evaluations.
(1) The department shall:
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports
to:
(i) assist the courts in sentencing;
(ii) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities regarding offenders;
(iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and
(iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the
department;
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic services based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases;
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting:
(i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and
mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders;
(ii) examinations when required by the court or Board of Pardons;
and
(iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds
necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under
Section 76-3-404.
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate
measures to be taken regarding offenders.
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports
prepared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1
and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or
by rules made by the Department of Corrections.
(b) The reports are intended only for use by:
(i) the court in the sentencing process;
(ii) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities;
and
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender.
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be
made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state if

the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being
evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of probation or parole.
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact
statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant
caused bodily harm or death to the victim.
(b) Victim impact statements shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense;
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered
by the victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and
permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or
otherwise unable to provide the information required under this section, the
information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or
family members, as necessary.
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of
complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of
corrections programs.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 15; 1987, ch. 116, § 14; 1991,
ch. 206, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment redesignated Subsections (1) through (3)
as present Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(c),
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (l)(d)
through (l)(f), and Subsection (5) as present
Subsection (2), respectively; designated the former introductory language as the introductory
language of present Subsection (1); substituted
"investigative services" for "investigative functions," "to assist" for "functions, and" preceding "the Board of Pardons" and "offenders" for
"the offender" and inserted "to assist" preceding "the department" in the introductory language of Subsection (1); deleted "subject to the
limitations of Subsection 64-13-15 (1)" from
the end of the first sentence of Subsection
(1Kb); substituted "regarding" for "on behalf
of in the second sentence of Subsection (1Kb);
deleted the former third sentence of Subsection
(1Kb) as set out in the bouna volume; rewrote

Subsection (l)(c); deleted "the defendant, his
attorney, the state's attorney, and" preceding
"other correctional programs" in Subsection
(l)(d); redesignated Subsections (4)(a) through
(4)(f) as present Subsections (l)(e)(i) through
QXeXvi); substituted "and" for "along with" in
Subsection (D(eXiii).
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, rewrote Subsection (1) as Subsections (1)
through (6), adding or changing the subsection
designations, adding Subsections (lXcXiii) and
(3)(b), inserting references to "diagnostic services" in Subsections (lXa) and (lXb), inserting
references to "presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports" in Subsections
(3)(a) and (4), substituting the language beginning with "as defined" in Subsection (3)(a) for
"under Chapter 2, Title 63, regarding information practices," and making several stylistic
changes throughout Subsections (1) through
(6), and redesignated Subsection (2) as Subsection (7).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

64-13-21. Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in
community.
The department, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise sentenced offenders placed in the community on probation by the courts, on parole by the Board of Pardons, or upon acceptance for supervision under the
terms of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers. Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the
department, giving priority, based on available resources, to felony offenders.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 16; 1987, ch. 116, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment rewrote the first sentence and made a
minor phraseology change in the second sentence.

64-13-22. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals
§ 64-13-22, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211,

§ 17, relating to community-based programs,
effective April 27, 1987.

64-13-23. Offender's income and finances.
The department may require each offender, while in the custody of the
department or while on probation or parole, to place funds received or earned
by him from any source into an account administered by the department or
into a joint account with the department at a federally insured financial
institution.
(1) The department may require each offender to maintain a minimum
balance in either or both accounts for the particular offender's use upon
discharge from the custody of the department or upon completion of parole or probation.
(2) If the funds are placed in a joint account at a federally insured
financial institution:
(a) any interest accrues to the benefit of the offender account; and
(b) the department may require that the signatures of both the
offender and a departmental representative be submitted to the financial institution to withdraw funds from the account.
(3) If the funds are placed in an account administered by the department, the department may by rule designate a certain portion of the
offender's funds as interest-bearing savings, and another portion as noninterest-bearing to be used for day-to-day expenses.
(4) The department may withhold part of the offender's funds in either
account for expenses of incarceration, supervision, or treatment; for courtordered restitution, reparation, fines, alimony, support payments or similar court-ordered payments; for department-ordered restitution; and for
any other debt to the state.
(5) (a) Offenders shall not be granted free process in civil actions, including petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, if, at any time from the

date the cause of action arose through the date the cause of action
remains pending, there are any funds in either account which have
not been withheld or are not subject to withholding under Subsection
(3) or (4).
(b) The amount assessed for the filing fee, service of process and
other fees and costs shall not exceed the total amount of funds the
offender has in excess of the indigence threshold established by the
department but not less than $25 including the withholdings under
Subsection (3) or (4) during the identified period of time.
(c) The amounts assessed shall not exceed the regular fees and
costs provided by law.
(6) The department may disclose information on offender accounts to
the Office of Recovery Services and other appropriate state agencies.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-23, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 116, § 16; 1991, ch. 125, § 1; 1992,
ch. 217, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987,
ch. 116, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-23, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, § 18, relating to
compensation for inmate employment, and
enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "while
in the custody of the department or while on
probation or parole" and substituted "funds re-

ceived or earned by him from any source" for
"his income from employment while in the custody of the department or while on probation or
parole" in the introductory paragraph and deleted "in its discretion" after "department
may" in Subsection (5).
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, inserted "the funds are" after "If" in Subsections (2) and (3); made a stylistic change in
Subsection (4); added Subsection (5); and redesignated former Subsection (5) as Subsection
(6).

64-13-24. Standards for staff training.
To assure the safe and professional operation of correctional programs, the
department shall establish policies setting minimum standards for the basic
training of all staff upon employment, and the subsequent regular training of
staff. The training standards of correctional officers who are designated as
peace officers shall be not less than those established by the Peace Officer
Standards and Training Council.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-24, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 19; 1987, ch. 116, § 17.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "staff upon employment" for
"newly employed staff," inserted "subsequent,"

and made a punctuation change in the first
sentence; and inserted "correctional officers
who are designated as" and substituted "shall
be not" for "may not be" in the second sentence,

64-13-25. Standards for programs.
(1) To promote accountability and to ensure safe and professional operation
of correctional programs, the department shall establish minimum standards
for the organization and operation of its programs.
(a) The standards shall be promulgated according to state rulemaking
provisions. Those standards that apply to offenders are exempt from the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46a, the Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act. Offenders are not a class of persons under that act.
(b) Standards shall provide for inquiring into and processing offender
complaints.

(2) There shall be an audit for compliance with standards according to
policies and procedures established by the department, for continued operation of correctional programs.
(a) At least every three years, the department shall internally audit all
programs for compliance with established standards.
(b) All financial statements and accounts of the department shall be
reviewed during the audit. Written review shall be provided to the managers of the programs and the executive director of the department.
(c) The reports shall be classified as confidential internal working papers and access is available at the discretion of the executive director or
the governor, or upon court order.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-25, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 20; 1987, ch. 116, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "its" for "the" near the end of
the introductory paragraph of Subsection (1);
deleted "and shall encompass all aspects of the
department operations" from the end of the
first sentence of Subsection (l)(a); added the
second sentence of Subsection (l)(a); deleted "a
means o r preceding "inquiring" in Subsection
(l)(b); substituted "There shall be an audit for"
for "Certification of and a comma for "is re-

quired" in the introductory paragraph of Subsection (2); substituted "three years" for "two
years" and "for compliance" for "and certify
compliance or noncompliance" in Subsection
(2)(a); substituted "available at the discretion
of the executive director or the governor, or
upon court order" for "governed by the State
Information Practices Act" in Subsection (2)(c);
and deleted former Subsection (2)(d), denying
certification to programs not complying with
standards.

64-13-26. Private providers of services*
(1) The department may contract with private providers or other agencies
for the provision of care, treatment, and supervision of offenders committed to
the care and custody of the department.
(2) (a) The department shall:
(i) establish standards for the operation of the programs; and
(ii) annually review the programs for compliance.
(b) The reviews shall be classified as confidential internal working
papers.
(c) Access to records regarding the reviews is available upon the discretion of the executive director or the governor, or upon court order.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-26, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 21; 1987, ch. 116, § 19; 1989,
ch. 224, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted 'The department may contract" for "Nothing in this chapter prohibits
the department from contracting" and "reviewed for compliance with standards set by
the department" for "certified to be in compliance with the departmental standards" in the
first sentence, added "and annually thereafter"
to the end of the first sentence, and added the
second and third sentences.

The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, designated the first sentence as present
Subsection (1); deleted "if the programs are reviewed for compliance with standards set by
the department within six months after commencing operation and annually thereafter" at
the end of Subsection (1); added Subsection
(2)(a); designated the former second sentence of
the section as Subsection (2Kb); and designated
the former third sentence of the section as Subsection (2)(c) and inserted "to records regarding the reviews" therein.

64-13-27. Records — Access.
(1) (a) The State Bureau of Criminal Identification, county attorneys' offices, and state and local law enforcement agencies shall furnish to the
department upon request a copy of records of any person arrested in this
state.
(b) The department shall maintain centralized files on all offenders
under the jurisdiction of the department and make the files available for
review by other criminal justice agencies upon request in cases where
offenders are the subject of active investigations.
(2) All records maintained by programs under contract to the department
providing services to public offenders are the property of the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-27, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 22; 1987, ch. 116, § 20; 1989,
ch. 224, § 3.
from
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted "public" preceding "offenders" in
the second sentence of Subsection (2).
. n B l V 9 8 9 a m e ^ e n t > effective April 24,
1989, designated the first and second sentences
of Subsection (1) as Subsections (l)(a) and (b)

and, in Subsection (2), deleted "and shall be
returned to it when the offender is terminated
the program" at the end of the present
provision and a second sentence that read "The
department shall maintain an accurate audit
r e c o r d o f i n f l a t i o n provided to other prooffenders under
s or
ies
regarding
-^ jurisdiction "

64-13-28. Hearings involving staff or offenders.
(1) The department shall maintain an administrative hearing office to con' duct hearings regarding offenders in the custody of the department, issues
involving staff, or any other administrative matters as assigned by the executive director of the Department of Corrections. The hearing officer may issue
subpoenas, compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and other documents, administer oaths, and take testimony under oath.
(2) The hearing officer shall maintain a summary record of all hearings and
provide timely written notice to participants of the decision and the reasons
for the decision.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-28, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 23; 1987, ch. 116, § 21; 1988,
ch. 191, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "may issue" for "shall be appointed by the executive director and has the
power to issue" in the second sentence.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, divided the former provisions into
present Subsection (1) and Subsection (2); in

the first sentence of Subsection (1), substituted
"hearings regarding offenders in the custody of
the department, issues involving staff, or any
other administrative matters as assigned by
the executive director of the Department of
Corrections" for "investigative hearings regarding offenders under supervision, staff matters in dispute, or other administrative matters in dispute"; and, in Subsection (2), inserted "timely."

64-13-29. Violation of parole or probation — Detention —
Hearing.
(1) The department shall ensure that the court is notified of violations of
the terms and conditions of probation in the case of probationers under the
department's supervision, or the Board of Pardons in the case of parolees
under the department's supervision. In cases where the department desires to
detain an offender alleged to have violated his parole or probation and where

it is unlikely that the Board of Pardons or court will conduct a hearing within
a reasonable time to determine if the offender has violated his conditions of
parole or probation, the department shall hold an administrative hearing
within a reasonable time, unless the hearing is waived by the parolee or
probationer, to determine if there is probable cause to believe that a violation
has occurred. If there is a conviction for a crime based on the same charges as
the probation or parole violation, or a finding by a federal or state court that
there is probable cause to believe that an offender has committed a crime
based on the same charges as the probation or parole violation, the department need not hold its administrative hearing.
(2) The appropriate officer or officers of the department shall, as soon as
practical following the department's administrative hearing, report to the
court or the Board of Pardons, furnishing a summary of the hearing, and may
make recommendations regarding the disposition to be made of the parolee or
probationer. Pending any proceeding under this section, the department may
take custody of and detain the parolee or probationer involved for a period not
to exceed 72 hours excluding weekends and holidays.
(3) If the hearing officer determines that there is probable cause to believe
that the offender has violated the conditions of his parole or probation, the
department may detain the offender for a reasonable period of time after the
hearing or waiver, as necessary to arrange for the incarceration of the offender. Written order of the department is sufficient authorization for any
peace officer to incarcerate the offender. The department may promulgate
rules for the implementation of this section.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-29, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 24; 1987, ch. 116, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided the section into subsections; substituted "violations" for "any violation," "probation" for "supervision," "probationers under
the department's" for "probation offenders under probation and parolees under the department s for offenders under parole in the first
sentence of Subsection (1); substituted the Ianzuace besinnine "In cases where the deoartguage Degmning in cases wnere me depart
ment desires and ending Tiis conditions of parole or probation" for "Prior to giving any notification" and "probable cause" for "reasonable
cause" in the second sentence of Subsection (1);
added the third sentence of Subsection (1); substituted "the department's administrative
hearing" for "termination of any hearing" and
"may make" for "making'' in the first sentence
of Subsection (2); substituted "under" for "pur-

suant to" and deleted 'prior to the hearing"
following "holidays" in the second sentence of
Subsection (2); substituted "the hearing officer
determines that there is probable cause to Deii e v e that the offender has violated the condi^ons of his parole or probation, the department
m a y d e t a m t h e o f f e n d e r » f o r « it appears to the
hean
officer or officers t h a t
remcarceration
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reincarceration m the first sentence of Sub^ ^ <3); substituted incarcerate the offender" for "effect retaking or reincarceration"
in tne
second sentence of Subsection (3); and
substituted "may promulgate rules" for "is authorized to promulgate appropriate policies
and procedures" in the last sentence of Subsection (3).

64-13-30, Expenses incurred by offenders — Payment to
department.
(1) The department shall establish and collect from offenders on work release programs reasonable costs of maintenance, transportation, and incidental expenses incurred by the department on behalf of the offenders. Priority
shall be given to restitution and family support obligations.
(2) The department, under its rules, may advance funds to any offender as
necessary to establish the offender in a work release program.

History: C. 1953, 64-13-30, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 25; 1987, ch. 116, § 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted the second sentence of Subsection

(1) and substituted "its rules" for "rules it prescribes" and made a punctuation change in
Subsection (2).

64-13-31. Emergencies.
In the case of riots, disturbances, or other emergencies at correctional facilities, the Department of Corrections has authority to direct the resolution of
the emergencies. The department may request and coordinate the assistance
of other state and local agencies in responding to the emergencies.
History. C. 1953, 64-13-31, enacted by L,
1985, ch. 211, § 26; 1987, ch. 116, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "at" for "in" preceding "correctional facilities" in the first sentence.

64-13-32. Discipline of offenders — Use of force.
If an offender offers violence to an officer or other employee of the Department of Corrections, or to another offender, or to any other person; attempts to
damage or damages any corrections property; attempts to escape; or resists or
refuses to obey any lawful and reasonable command; the officers and other
employees of the department may use all reasonable means, including the use
of weapons, to defend themselves and department property and to enforce the
observance of discipline and prevent escapes. An inmate in the act of escaping
from a secure correctional facility is presumptive evidence that he poses a
threat of death or serious bodily injury to an officer or others if apprehension
is delayed.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-32, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 27; 1987, ch. 116, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "offender, or to any" for "inmate or" and made punctuation changes in the
first sentence and added the second sentence.

64-13-33. Restitution for offenses.
Following an administrative hearing, the department is authorized to require restitution from an offender for expenses incurred by the department as
a result of the offender's violation of department rules. The department is
authorized to require payment from the offender's account or to place a hold
on it to secure compliance with this section.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-33, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 28.

64-13-34. Safety of offenders.
In case of disaster or acts of God that threaten the safety of inmates or the
security of a secure correctional facility, inmates may be moved to a suitable
place of security. Inmates shall be returned to a correctional facility as soon as
it is practicable.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-34, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 29; 1987, ch. 116, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "a secure correctional facility" for "the prison" and deleted "where those

who are ill shall receive necessary medical care
and attention" following "place of security" in
the first sentence; and substituted "a correctional facility" for "the prison" and "practicabie" for "safe" in the second sentence.

64-13-35. Items prohibited in correctional facilities — Penalties.
(1) Except as provided by department policy, no firearm, dangerous
weapon, implement of escape, explosive, drug, spirituous or fermented liquor,
medicine, or poison may be:
(a) transported to or upon a correctional facility or its appurtenant
grounds;

(b) sold or given away at any correctional facility or in any building
appurtenant to a secure correctional facility, or on land granted to the
state for the use and benefit of the department; or
(c) given to, or used by, any offender at a correctional facility.
(2) (a) Any person who transports to or upon a correctional facility or its
appurtenant grounds any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, with intent to provide or sell it to any offender, is
guilty of a second degree felony.
(b) Any person who provides or sells to any offender at a correctional
facility any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, is guilty of a second degree felony.
(c) Any offender who possesses at a correctional facility any firearm,
dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, is guilty of a second
degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "drug" means any chemical or physical substance in any of its physical or chemical states as defined in the Controlled
Substances Act.
(4) Penalties for drug violations under this section are as provided in Section 58-37-8, Controlled Substances Act.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-35, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 30; 1987, ch. 116, § 27; 1990,
ch. 238, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "by department policy, no
firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive" for "in
Subsection (2), no" and made a punctuation
change in the introductory language of Subsection (1); substituted a correctional facih y or
its appurtenant grounds for corrections
• » in
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premises'
(l)(a);
any correctional facility" for "in any prison",

"secure correctional facility" for "prison," and
"the department" for "prisons" in Subsection
(1Kb); substituted "offender at a correctional
facility" for "inmate in the prison except under
direction of department medical authorities" in
Subsection (l)(c); and rewrote Subsection (2).
T h e 1 9 9 0 amendment, effective April 23,
1 9 9 0 i n s e r t e d « i m p l e m e n t o f e s C a P e" through^
^ a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n (4).
QUt ^
o 4. • „ r ^ i~
n
Di.
Cross-References.
— Sentencing
* for felom e s §§ 7 6 3 2 0
'
- " ^ 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

64-13-36- Testing of prisoners for AIDS and HIV infection
— Segregation — Medical care — Department authority.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Prisoner" means a person who has been adjudicated and found
guilty of a criminal offense, who is in the custody of and under the jurisdiction of the department.
(b) "Test" or "testing" means a test or tests for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection in accordance with standards recommended by the Department of Health.
(2) (a) Within 90 days after July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the
department shall test or provide for testing of all prisoners who are under
the jurisdiction of the department, and subsequently test or provide for
testing of all prisoners who are committed to the jurisdiction of the department upon admission or within a reasonable period after admission.
(b) At the time that test results are provided to persons tested, the
department shall provide education and counseling regarding Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection.

. (3> (a) The results of tests conducted under Subsection (2) shall become
part of the inmate's medical file, accessible only to persons designated by
the department by rule, and in accordance with any other legal requirement for reporting of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human
Immunodeficiency Virus infection.
(b) Medical and epidemiological information regarding results of tests
conducted under Subsection (2) shall be provided to the Department of
Health.
(4) (a) The department shall house prisoners who test positive for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection in a single cell or room or provide for segregation of that person from
members of the prison population. No person who tests negative for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus
infection may be placed or housed in a cell or room with a person who has
tested positive for either of those conditions, except upon his written
request.
(b) The department shall provide reasonable and adequate medical
care for members of the prison population who test positive for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection.
(c) The department has authority to take action with regard to any
prisoner who has tested positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection, as it deems reasonable and necessary for the safety and security of the prison population
and prison staff.
(d) This subsection does not require or suggest that prisoners who test
positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection be placed in separate cell blocks or cell areas
separate from the general prison population, unless such separation is
medically necessary for the protection of the general prison population or
staff.
(e) Prisoners who test positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection may not be excluded
from common areas of the prison that are accessible to other prisoners,
solely on the basis of that condition, unless it is medically necessary for
protection of the general prison population or staff.
(5) If the department complies with Subsections (2), (3), and (4) it shall be
considered to have discharged its duty and to have taken reasonable and
necessary precautions to prevent transmission of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-36, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 234, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 234, § 2
makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.
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Section
77-18-15.
77-18-16.
77-18-17.
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Fee — Agencies.
Penalty.
Retroactive application.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the Department of Corrections.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and
presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the
department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to
determine what level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the Department
of Corrections.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
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(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections
regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant;
(hi) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe amy change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the
defendant.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
Department of Corrections.
(6) The Department of Corrections shall make the presentence investigation
report available for review at the court ten days in advance of sentencing and
shall mail or deliver copies to the defendant, defendant's attorney, and
prosecutor ten days in advance of sentencing. Any inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and
Department of Corrections prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the
attention of the sentencing judge, and a determination of relevance or accuracy
shall be made by the judge on the record. If a party fails to raise an objection
at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
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(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the comity jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(9) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the
court, for the collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed
under Section 64-13-21 during the probation period in cases for which the
court orders supervised probation by the department.
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the
clerk of the court.
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide
notice of the order to the parties.
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination
of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a
probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding
fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
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(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful
and maUcious injury for pin-poses of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
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condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection.
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified private in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 1,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; or
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2;
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch.
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3;
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994,
ch. 230, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added Subsection (11).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 66, effective
April 29, 1991, in present Subsection (2)(a)
substituted "guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no
contest" for "guilty or no contest" in the first
sentence.
The 1991 amendment by ch. 206, effective
April 29, 1991, added present Subsection (1),
redesignating the following subsections accordingly; subdivided Subsections (2)(b), (3), (5Xa),
(7), (8)(a), (9)(a), and (10); substituted "appropriations subcommittee" for "appropriations
committee" at the end of Subsection (3Xe);
substituted the language beginning with "presentence" and ending with "court order" for
"report are confidential and not available except" in Subsection (5)(a)(iii); inserted "evidence" in the first and second sentences of
Subsection (5)(b); added Subsections (5)(c) and
(13); and made several punctuation and stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, added "including the community service
program provided in Section 78-11-20.7" to the

end of Subsection (6)(g).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 82, effective May
3,1993, added Subsection (2) and redesignated
former Subsections (2) through (13) as Subsections (3) through (14).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 220, effective
May 3, 1993, added "and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21" in present Subsection (8), substituted "owes" for Tias" and "or
other assessed costs" for "owing" and added
"and other amounts outstanding" in present
Subsection (9Xa)(ii), substituted "and other
amounts outstanding" for "orders" in present
Subsection (9)(b), and made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 13, effective May
2, 1994 substituted "Board of Pardons and
Parole" for "Board of Pardons" in Subsections
(lXc) and (4)(b); substituted "Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas in Abeyance" for "Sections 77-2a-l
through 77-2a-4" in Subsection (2); substituted
"Subsection (4)(a)" for "Subsection (a)" in Subsection (4)(d); and made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 198, effective
May 2, 1994, added Subsection (6)(a)(ii), renumbering former Subsections (6)(a)(ii) and
(iii) as (iii) and (iv), and made a stylistic change.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 230, effective
May 2, 1994, deleted former Subsection (1)
which defined "confidential"; inserted "and Parole" in Subsection (3)(b); added Subsection (6);
designated former Subsection (6)(b) as Subsection (7); deleted former Subsection (6)(c) pertaining to the disposition of the presentence
investigation report after the sentencing; deleted former Subsection (14), relating to disclosure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and

260

investigation reports
and made related an
This section is set
Office of Legislativt
Counsel.
Compiler's Note
proposes amending I
and proposes addin
article. If approved 1

Due process of law.
Extension of probati
Restitution.
-—Death of defendai
Revocation of proba
—Nature of violatic
—Notice of grounds
—Standard of prooi
—Time for proceedi
—Written findings.
Suspension of prob*
Termination of prot
Cited.
Due process of la
Trial court did no
process rights by n
tion to continue sen
examination and e
facilities that had i
dant had full and
sentence report anc
almost two weeks
the opportunity to
ceived factual ina
818 P.2d 1048 (Ut£
Extension of pro
Proceedings for
menced prior to
term gave the cour
dant until conclu
State v. Rawlings,
1992).
Restitution.
The state can e
condition of proba
as a separate anc
the court's judgme
nal sentence unc
76-3-201.1(1). The
risdiction to requi:
condition of probt
minish the enforc
independent com
creed in the judgn
1203 (Utah Ct. /
P.2d 897 (Utah 11

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.
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FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUN 2 4 1997
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 960831-CA
v.
Tony R. Maestas,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Davis, Wilkins, and Jackson.
This matter is before the court on a Motion for Remand for
Supplementation of the Record and for Determination of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, pursuant to Rule 23B of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded
to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with Rule 23B of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and entry of findings of
fact regarding appellantfs claim of ineffective assistance of his
trial counsel.
/
Dated this ^ T day of June, 1997
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on June 24, 1997, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal
representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be delivered to
the party listed below:
Lynn R. Brown
Rebecca C. Hyde
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 E. 500 S., #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was handdelivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's
Office to be delivered to the party listed below:
James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
Honorable William A. Thorne
Third District Court
240 E. 400 S.
Salt Lake City, UT*84111
Third District Court
Attn: Suzie Carlson
240 E. 400 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this< June 24, 1997.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff,

:

TONY MAESTAS,

Case No. 921901600FS
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE

Defendant.

:

On October 17,1997, an Evidentiary Hearing was held in the above-entitled
matter pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. Pro. for the purpose of entering Findings of
Fact relevant to Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both parties were
present. Pursuant to Rule 23B(e), Utah R. App Pro. and based upon the evidence
presented by Appellant, this Court enters the following Findings of Fact:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Defendant, Tony Maestas, was represented at trial by

Mr. Victor Gordon.
2.

The Court has reviewed records contained in Tony Waldron's prison

file maintained by the Utah Department of Corrections.
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3.

Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the

Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec.
(1993).
4.

The Court has reviewed records maintained by the Investigations

Bureau of the Utah Department of Corrections relating to the arrest and conviction of
Tony Maestas, and the use of Tony Waldron as a confidential informant.
5.

Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the

Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec.
(1993).
6.

The aforementioned records contain the following information:

7.

Tony Waldron (Waldron) was committed to the prison on November

5, 1990, on a conviction of two counts of Forgery, second degree felonies.
8.

Waldron's expected release date from prison was January 14,1993.

9.

As late as February 7, 1992, Waldron's expected release date

remained unchanged.
10.

On August 15, 1991, Waldron was assigned to work at the prison

11.

On November 26, 1991, Waldron was one of three inmates

dairy.

suspected of smuggling drugs at the dairy into D block.
12.

On February 21,1992, Waldron was found to have injection sites on

his arm. Waldron admitted he had been injecting steroids at the dairy.
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13.

Waldron was recruited by Leo Lucy, an investigator with the

Department of Corrections to work as a confidential informant.
14.

On March 14, 1992, Waldron was moved from D-block on a

temporary restriction order because he was "under investigation".
15.

On March 14, 1992, Waldron was released on a home visit where

he agreed to purchase drugs to be smuggled into the prison as part of an undercover
operation for the Investigations Bureau of the Department of Corrections.
16.

On March 14,1992, Tony Maestas was arrested for allegedly selling

cocaine to Tony Waldron.
17.

On April 2,1992, a Special Attention Hearing was held by the Board

of Pardons. A Special Attention Hearing is a review to grant relief to inmates under
special circumstances where a change of status may be warranted.
18.

Waldron was paroled that day. He was serving time for ten counts

of Forgery, second degree felonies, one count of Fraud, a third degree felony, and an
additional count of Forgery, a third degree felony.
19.

Waldron was never formally disciplined for possession of a controlled

substance or drug paraphernalia.
20.

Waldron was never charged with Possession of a Controlled

Substance or Drug Paraphernalia.
21.

Waldron was never charged as a result of the Department of

Corrections' investigation that began November 26, 1991, of his involvement in
smuggling drugs into D-block.
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22.

Leo Lucy, the investigator with the Department of Corrections who

recruited Waldron, in a written statement, claimed that the only compensation Waldron
received fo his role as a confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the
Board of Pardons that Waldron not lose his parole date as a result of a dirty urine test.
23.

A review of Waldron's prison files also revealed the following

information relevant to his credibility:
a.

Waldron was convicted on September 14, 1992, of Forgery,

a second degree felony, as well as Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner and Felony
Fleeing.
b.

Waldron was convicted on December 12, 1990, of two counts

of Forgery, second degree felonies.
c.

On August 7,1986, Waldron was committed to the Utah State

Prison on one count of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third degree felony, seven
counts of Forgery, second degree felonies, and one count of Forgery, a third degree
felony.
d.

Waldron had been assessed by the Department of Corrections

in 1987 and had been described as an inmate who "cannot be trusted at all".
e.

In October of 1990, Waldron approached Lon Brian with the

Davis County Metro Narcotics wanting to furnish information. Agent Brian requested use
of Waldron for an undercover investigation. AP&P determined that "it would not be wise
to allow him to participate" because of his history of drug dependency and attempted
escape. Waldron was told "there would be no special consideration".
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24.

Also relevant to Waldron's credibility was the following information

regarding his experience and skill at obtaining and hiding drugs on his person in the
prison:
a.

The investigation into Waldron and other inmates that began

in November of 1991 involved allegations that inmates were smuggling drugs by either
hiding them in balloons in the mouth, or by "keistering" the drugs by hiding them in the
anal cavity.
b.

On November 10,1989, Waldron was disciplined for a positive

urinalysis for marijuana and for hiding a white object in his mouth which he swallowed
before guards could retrieve it.
c.

On November 20, 1989, Waldron admitted hiding two

marijuana joints in his mouth while being searched, slipping them from his mouth into
a "pocket" he had cut inside his coat when the guard was not looking.
d.

On January 1, 1988, Waldron was disciplined for Possession

of a Controlled Substance found hidden in his sock.
e.

On May 29, 1988, Waldron was disciplined for possession of

a controlled substance.
f.

On June 7, 1988, Waldron was disciplined for a positive

urinalysis for marijuana.
g.

On March 30, 1987, Waldron was disciplined for possession

of a controlled substance.
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25.

A review of Waldron's prison file also revealed the following

information suggesting that he had worked as confidential informant in the past:
a.

On July 15,1992, Waldron had safety concerns at the Weber

County Jail because he had testified against other inmates.
b.

On November 5,1990, Waldron asked to be moved because

of involvement in past drug dealing at the prison.
c.

Waldron's Offender Reassessment forms indicate he had

safety concerns in February of 1990 and also in July of 1991.
26.

In respect to the chain of custody in Mr. Maestas' case, it was also

discovered that money booked into evidence with the alleged cocaine was likely stolen
by the custodian of the evidence^.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of December, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Deputy District Attorney

Attorney for Defendant
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District
Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this
December, 1997.
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1

THE COURT:

The Court finds there has

2

been a violation of the terms of the conditions of

3

probation.

4

intentional under circumstances where the defendant

5

had the ability to comply with the Court's order on

6

the conditions of probation.

7

will be revoked.

8

are only so many chances that the Court has the

9

disposition or the opportunity to grant them in one

10

case and deny them in another because there are only

11

limited resources out there. We need to provide

12

those resources to the people who have indicated they

13

will take advantage of that. And that is not so in

14

this case.

That violation was knowing and

Therefore probation

It will not be reinstated.

There

15

I do think, however, given the amount of

16

delay that has occurred and since the feeling of the

17

affidavit is in support of the order to show cause

18

and this is a unique case, the defendant is entitled

19

to credit for time served in the Salt Lake County

20

Jail.

21

the minute entry and in the order -- well, you're

22

going to have to prepare papers for me on this, Mr.

23

Shepherd.

24

the Court is aware of the view of the Department of

25

Corrections that credit for time served is not

I would ask the clerk to note specifically in

Would you note specifically in there that

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

normally granted by them when the time served is a
result of an order to show cause*

And the credit for

time served normally is limited only to pretrial
time.

And it's my recommendation that he be given

credit for time served during the pendency of this
matter.
Is there anything else?

If not, we'll be

in recess.
(Concluded at 4:45 p.m.)
—0O0—

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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HAVE SPONTANEOUS TESTIMONY.

TONY WALDRON.
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

DIRECT EXAMINATION.
BY MR. SHEPHERD:
Q.

WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME.

A.

TONY WALDRON.

Q.

WILL YOU SPELL THAT, PLEASE.

A.

W-A-L-D-R-O-N.

Q.

MR. WALDRON, ARE YOU PRESENTLY AN INMATE AT

THE UTAH STATE PRISON?
A.

YES, I AM.

Q.

DIRECTING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE 14TH OF

MARCH OF 1992, WERE YOU AN INMATE ON THAT DATE?
A.

YES, I WAS.

Q.

AND ON THAT DATE DID YOU ASSIST LEO LUCEY

IN A DEPARTMENT OF OF CORRECTIONS INVESTIGATION
RELATIVE TO ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE SOME PEOPLE WHO
WERE PROVIDING SOURCES FOR NARCOTICS IN THE PRISON?
A.

YES.

I DID.

Q.

DID YOU GO IN THE COMPANY OF AN AGENT NAMED

TERESA GABALDON?

1

A.

YES, I DID.

2

Q.

ON THAT DATE DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO TO

3

AN APARTMENT LOCATED ON APPROXIMATELY FIFTH EAST

4

JUST SOUTH OF 33RD SOUTH.

5

APARTMENT OF JEANETTE APPLEMAN?

I BELIEVE IT WAS THE

6

A.

YES, SIR.

7

Q.

NOW, DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO INTO

8I

MS. APPLEMAN'S APARTMENT WHILE TERESA GABALDON

9

REMAINED IN THE CAR?

10

A.

YES.

11

Q.

AND WERE YOU AWARE THAT MS. GABALDON AND

12

JEANETTE APPLEMAN WERE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CONTACT

13

WITH SOMEONE TO SEE IF THEY COULD ARRANGE THE

14

PURCHASE OF COCAINE?

15

A.

YES.

16

Q.

WHILE YOU WERE IN THE APARTMENT, DID

17

SOMEONE COME TO THE APARTMENT AND MAKE SOME CONTACT

18

WITH HE YOU THERE?

19

A.

YES, THEY DID.

20

Q.

WAS ANYONE ELSE IN THE APARTMENT AT THE

21

TIME?

22

A.

THERE WAS.

23

Q.

WHO WAS THAT?

24

A.

MR. CHACON AND A COUPLE OF CHILDREN.

25

Q.

DID SOMEONE ELSE COME TO THE APARTMENT?

A.

YES, THEY DID.

Q.

WHO WAS THAT?

A.

MR. MAESTAS.

Q.

MR. MAESTAS?

A.

AND ANOTHER FELLOW.

Q.

ANOTHER PERSON?

A.

YES.

Q.

WHEN THEY CAME TO THE APARTMENT, WHAT DID

THEY DO?
A.

THEY COME AND ASKED FOR JEANETTE, AND WE

SAID THAT SHE WAS MAKING A PHONE CALL TRYING TO GET
SOME COCAINE.
Q.

WHAT HAPPENED THEN?

A.

HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I

HAVE THIS RIGHT HERE."
Q.

WHO SAID THAT?

A.

MR. MAESTAS.

Q.

NOW, HE SAID WHAT?

A.

HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I

HAVE THIS."THIS.
Q.

"I HAVE THIS"?

A.

YES.

Q.

AND WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM?

A.

I TOLD HIM I WASN'T.

Q.

WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM THAT YOU WERE, IF

ASKED ME I WAS A COP.

ANYTHING?
A.

ON A HOME VISIT.

Q.

THEN WHAT HAPPENED?

A.

WELL, WHEN HE BROUGHT OUT —

LEFT.

HIS FRIEND

HE SHOWED ME THE COCAINE, AND I GAVE HIM ONE

HUNDRED DOLLARS.

HE SAYS, "WELL, I'M GOING TO GO."

AND HE LEFT.
I WENT IN THE BATHROOM, BECAUSE I WAS
WIRED, AND TOLD LEO AND THEM TO GET THE TWO MEXICANS
THAT LEFT THE APARTMENT BUILDING.
Q.

WHERE DID YOU OBTAIN THE MONEY?

FROM LEO?

A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

HAD YOU BEEN SEARCHED PRIOR TO THIS

OPERATION BEGINNING?
A.

YES.

Q.

WHO DID THAT SEARCH?

A.

LEO LUCEY.

Q.

WERE YOU SEARCHED AFTER THE OPERATION?

A.

YES.

Q.

AND WAS THAT BY ALSO LEO?

A.

YES.

Q.

NOW, AFTER YOU OBTAINED THE ALLEGED

COCAINE, AND INDICATED ON THE WIRE THAT IT HAD
HAPPENED, WHAT DID YOU DO THEN?
A.

JUST REMAINED IN THE APARTMENT.

84
Q.

THEN WHAT HAPPENED?

A.

THEN WE —

OVER.

I GUESS THEY WENT AND PULLED HIM

THEN SOME RELATION OF HIS LIVES NEXT DOOR,

AND WE WERE GIVEN SOME MARIJUANA FROM THEM.
Q.

WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE COCAINE?

A.

I TOOK IT DOWN TO TERESA AND GIVE TO HER.

Q.

YOU GAVE IT TO HER?

A.

YES.

Q.

THEN DID YOU GO BACK TO THE APARTMENT?

A.

YES.

Q.

I WILL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS

EXHIBIT TWO FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES.
JUST LIKE TO LOOK AT THAT.

IF YOU'D

DOES THAT APPEAR TO BE

THE SAME OR SIMILAR TO THE PACKAGE THAT YOU OBTAINED
FROM MR. MAESTAS?
A.

YES.
MR. SHEPHERD:

THANK YOU.

I HAVE NO

FURTHER QUESTIONS.

CROSS-EXAMINATION.
BY MR. GORDON:
Q.

WERE YOU USING DRUGS THAT DAY?

A.

NO.

Q.

HAVE YOU USED DRUGS IN THE PAST?

A.

YES, I HAVE.

1

Q.

SO YOU KNOW WHAT THEY LOOK LIKE?

2

A.

YES, I DO.

3

Q.

HAVE YOU USED ANY DRUGS SUBSEQUENT TO THAT?

4
5

MR. SHEPHERD:

I OBJECT.

I DON'T THINK

THAT'S RELEVANT TO THIS.

6

THE COURT:

WHAT'S THE RELEVANCE?

7

MR. GORDON:

WELL, IT'S A CONTINUING

8

PATTERN.

9

THAT.

10
11
12
13

HE'S A HABITUAL USER, AND I WANTED TO SHOW

THE COURT:

SUSTAINED.

YOU DON'T NEED TO

ANSWER THE QUESTION.
Q.

(BY MR. GORDON)

ARE YOU CURRENTLY SERVING

TIME ON A DRUG-RELATED OFFENSE.

14

A.

NO, I'M NOT.

15

Q.

OKAY.

WHEN DID YOU HAVE YOUR HOME VISIT?

16

WHY DID YOU TAKE YOUR HOME VISIT TIME TO INVOLVE

17

YOURSELF IN —

18
19
20
21

A.

IN A RISKY KIND OF PROJECT?

I WAS —

MR. LEO SAID HE'D WRITE ME A GOOD

RECOMMENDATION TO THE BOARD.
Q.

SO YOU WERE PROMISED A GOOD RECOMMENDATION

IF YOU HELPED OUT?

22

A.

I WAS PROMISED A LETTER.

23

Q.

NOW--

24
25

THE COURT:
YOUR VOICE UP.

THAT WAS IT.

MR. WALDRON, YOU NEED TO KEEP

IT'S HARD TO HEAR YOU.

THE WITNESS: OKAY.
Q.
ME SEE —

(BY MR. GORDON)

NOW LET ME ASK YOU— LET

DESCRIBE TO ME WHAT HAPPENED ON THAT

PARTICULAR DAY?

YOU STARTED OUT AT WHAT, ABOUT

EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING?
A.

YES.

Q.

YOU WERE SEARCHED AT EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE

MORNING?
A.

YES.

Q.

OKAY.

A.

I THINK IT WAS THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS.

Q.

AND A WIRE WAS PLACED ON YOU AT THAT TIME?

A.

YES, IT WAS.

Q.

HOW MANY TIMES WERE YOU SEARCHED THAT DAY?

A.

APPROXIMATELY FIVE.

Q.

WHAT KIND OF SEARCH WAS THAT?

A.

PAT DOWN.

Q.

PAT DOWN?

A.

I TOOK MY SHOES OFF.

Q.

SO THEY DIDN'T REALLY —

AND HOW MUCH MONEY WERE YOU GIVEN?

NO BODY CAVITIES

WERE SEARCHED ON ANY OF THOSE?
A.

NO.

Q.

NO.

OKAY.

LET ME ASK YOU THIS.

YOU WERE

SITTING UP IN AN APARTMENT AT THE VILLA FRANCHAIS,
MAYBE AROUND NOON, EVERYBODY HAD GONE.

YOU WERE

WATCHING CHILDREN?
A.

I WAS WITH MS. CHACON.

Q.

SHE FINALLY LEFT, AND YOU WERE BY YOURSELF?

A.

NO.

Q.

THERE WAS NO TIME THAT YOU BY YOURSELF?

A.

NO, THERE WASN'T.

Q.

LET ME —

SHE NEVER LEFT.

SO IF I CAN REFRESH YOUR MEMORY,

YOU ARE SPEAKING OVER THE WIRE AND YOU'RE SAYING,
"HOW'RE YOU DOING?

I AM TALKING TO A BABY, SO YOU

DON'T THINK I AM HERE TALKING TO MYSELF."
A.

YES.

MS. CHACON WAS IN THE BATHROOM.

Q.

SHE WAS IN THE BATHROOM, SO YOU WERE ACTUAL

BY YOURSELF, HUH?
A.

IN THE LIVING ROOM.

YES.

Q.

HUH?

A.

YES.

Q.

THIS SAYS, "TERESA AND THE LADY THAT LIVES

I WAS TEN FEET AWAY FROM HER.

HERE WENT TO GO PAGE THE GUY TO GET SOME COKE."
A.

YES.

Q.

DO YOU RECALL THAT?

A.

YES.

Q.

"THEY SHOULD BE BACK IN A MINUTE.

THEY

HAVE GOT ME HERE LISTENING TO NIGGER MUSIC."
REMEMBER THAT?
A.

YES.

DO YOU

1

Q.

DO YOU REMEMBER SAYING THAT?

2

A.

YES, I DO.

3

Q.

WHY WOULD YOU MAKE A STATEMENT LIKE THAT?

4I

DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH BLACK PEOPLE?

5

A.

NO.

6

Q.

THAT WAS PLAIN LANGUAGE.

7

IN PRISON?

8

A.

YES.

9

Q.

WERE YOU EVER STRIPPED?

10

A.

WHEN I WENT TO PRISON ~

11

MEXICANS?

I LIVE WITH THEM.
FROM WHEN YOU ARE

BACK TO PRISON

THAT NIGHT, YES, I WAS.

12

Q.

BUT YOU WEREN'T STRIPPED DURING THE DAY?

131

A.

NO.

14

Q.

WHY WERE YOU RECRUITED?

15

A.

YES.

16

Q.

YOU VOLUNTEERED FOR THIS PROJECT.

17

A.

YES.

18

MR. GORDON:

19

MR. SHEPHERD:

20

THE COURT:

21

DID YOU VOLUNTEER?

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.

MAY MR. WALDRON BE EXCUSED,

THEN?

22

MR. SHEPHERD:

23

MR. GORDON:

NO.

24

THE COURT:

THANK YOU, MR. WALDRON.

25

MAY STEP DOWN.

I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT.

YOU MAY BE EXCUSED.

YOU

1
2I

MR. SHEPHERD:

ASK LEO LUCEY TO COME IN

PLEAS.

3
4

LEO LUCEY.

5

CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS

6

EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

7
8

DIRECT EXAMINATION

9

BY MR. SHEPHERD:

10

Q.

WILL YOU STATE YOUR FULL NAME, PLEASE.

11

A.

LEO S. LUCEY.

12

Q.

WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED?

13

A.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF UTAH.

14

Q.

HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE

15

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS?

16

A.

FIVE YEARS.

17

Q.

WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT ASSIGNMENT?

18

A.

I'M AN INVESTIGATOR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF

19
20
21

CORRECTIONS.
Q.

HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED AS AN

INVESTIGATOR?

22

A.

A LITTLE OVER A YEAR.

23

Q.

WHAT SORT OF TRAINING HAVE YOU HAD, AND

24
25

BACKGROUND THAT QUALIFIES YOU FOR THAT POSITION?
A.

I'M A CERTIFIED PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE

